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AUTHORSHIP, AUDIENCES, AND
ANONYMOUS SPEECH
Lyrissa Barnett Lidshy*
Thomas F. Cottert
Thence comes it that my name receives a brand,
And almost thence my nature is subdu'd
To what it works in, like the dyer's hand.
-William Shakespeare, Sonnet 1111
INTRODUCTION

What's in a name? Audiences often rely on author identity to
reduce the search costs involved in sorting and interpreting the constant barrage of messages they receive. 2 Yet the First Amendment, as
© 2007 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter. Individuals and nonprofit
institutions may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or
below cost, for educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author,
provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and
copyright notice.
* University of Florida Research Foundation Professor, Fredric G. Levin College
of Law.
t Professor, University of Minnesota Law School.
The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of David Anderson, Mark
Fenster, Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Elizabeth Lear, Bill Page, Doug Rendleman,
Christopher Peterson, Elizabeth Rowe, Mike Siebecker and participants at faculty
workshops at Washington and Lee University School of Law, at the Sixth Annual
Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at the University of California at Berkeley,
and at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. The authors also wish to thank
Jeff Childers and Nicholas Frazier for exceptional research assistance.
1 WILLMA SRAKESPEARE, Sonnets (London 1609), in THE RrVERSIDE SHARESPEARE
1863 (2d ed. 1997).
2 For recent discussions of authorial attribution and its relation to trademark
law, see Catherine L. Fisk, Credit Where It's Due: The Law & Norms of Attribution, 95 GEO.
L.J. 49 (2006); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author's Name as a Trademark: A PerversePerspective
on the Moral Right of "Paternity"?,23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENr. L.J. 379 (2005); Laura A.
Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym: Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80
NOTR DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1171 (2005); see also infra Part II.A (discussing the effects authorial attribution can have on the credibility of speech). In face-to-face
1537
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interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, confers upon
authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, even when
doing so interferes with audiences' attempts to decode their
messages.3 In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,4 the Supreme
Court emphasized the contributions anonymous speakers have made
to public discourse and held that the State cannot punish citizens for
5
pseudonymous publication of handbills concerning a ballot initiative.
But this right to speak anonymously is not absolute. In McConnell v.
FEC,6 the Court emphasized the dangers of anonymous speech and
qualified the right to speak anonymously, though none too explicitly,
by upholding a statutory provision requiring persons who purchase
television advertisements advocating for or against a candidate for fed7
eral office to disclose their identities.
These decisions, and the handful of others addressing anonymous speech," provide insufficient guidance to lower courts dealing
with the growing problem of malfeasance by anonymous speakers
online,9 and with the growing threat frivolous lawsuits pose to legitimate anonymous speech.10 Although speech emanating from unidencommunications, the communicative impact of identity is even greater: an audience
will rely on the speaker's posture, dress, body language, and facial expressions to
gauge the sincerity and credibility of her message. See, e.g., ERVING GOFEMAN, THE
PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY Lien 249 (1959) ("Underlying all social interaction
there seems to be a fundamental dialectic. When one individual enters the presence
of others, he will want to discover the facts of the situations ....
Full information of
this order is rarely available; in its absence, the individual tends to employ substitutes-cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status symbols, etc.-as predictive
devices.").
3 Throughout this Article, we generally use the term "anonymous" to refer to
both anonymous and pseudonymous speech-that is, to speech by an author whose
identity is unknown, whether or not that identity is ultimately traceable. See L. Detweiler, Identity, Privacy, and Anonymity on the Internet § 3.1 (1993), http://www.rewi.huberlin.de/jura/proj/dsi/Netze/privint.html ("anonymity is the absence of identity").
4 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
5 Id. at 341-42.
6 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
7 Id. at 128.
8 See infra note 13.
9 A USA Today article reports that in the last two years, "more than 50 lawsuits
stemming from postings on blogs and website message boards have been filed across
the nation." Laura Parker, Courts Are Asked to Crack Down on Bloggers, Websites, USA
TODAY, Oct. 3, 2006, at Al.

10 The growth is largely attributable to the Internet, which has made anonymous
speech much more common. See generally Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, SilencingJohn Doe:
Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855, 860 (2000) (noting that the
Internet "empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to 'publish'
their views on matters of public concern"). A new category of lawsuits against anony-
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tifiable sources contributes to the diversity, quantity, and quality of
voices in the marketplace of ideas, I anonymity can also shield speakers from liability for a variety of torts, including defamation, invasion
of privacy, fraud, copyright infringement, and trade secret misappropriation. A relatively "strong" right to speak anonymously therefore
may induce more "core" First Amendment speech while enabling
more tortfeasors to avoid detection; on the other hand, a weak or nonexistent right to speak anonymously would tend to chill core speech
but also render more tortfeasors amenable to legal process.
This Article aims to assist lawmakers and courts to find the proper
balance between the right to speak without disclosing one's true identity and the rights of those injured by anonymous speech. To this
end, we present both a positive and a normative analysis of anonymous speech. In the positive analysis, we examine the private costs
and benefits that speakers encounter when deciding whether to publish with or without attribution; among these costs and benefits are
the potentially differing responses of audiences to attributed and
nonattributed speech. For example, speakers may feel less vulnerable
to retaliation when they speak anonymously, and thus may be more
apt both to speak truthfully and to engage in tortious or harmful
speech. At the same time, audiences are likely to discount the value of
nonattributed speech, thus mitigating some (but not all) of anonymous speech's potential harm.1 2 In theory, audiences could be either
mous online speakers has garnered the label "cyberSLAPP" from those who see the
suits as frivolous; people who tend to view them favorably refer to the speech at issue
as "cybersmears." CompareShaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPPSuits andJohn Doe Subpoenas:
Balancing Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 493, 498 (2001) ("[Dlespite some valid claims, many legal experts and privacy advocates claim that companies are abusing the legal process simply to 'out' their
online critics."), with Thomas G. Ciarlone, Jr. & Eric W. Wiechmann, Cybersmear May
Be Coming to a Web Site Near You: A Primerfor CorporateVictims, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 51, 52
(2003) ("Companies that try to curb the dissemination of misinformation are improperly cast as corporate bullies. Quite the contrary. These companies are honoring
their obligation to shareholders to attend to matters that jeopardize reputation,
brand name, and thus profitability.").
11 We concede at the outset that the "marketplace" metaphor has its limitations.
AsJeffrey Stake notes, however, in spite of criticism the metaphor "will likely persist as
a normative framework for analyzing First Amendment issues until we find a better
model." Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Approach to the First
Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REv. 1213, 1214 (2001). And we do think that the metaphor,
hackneyed and incomplete as it may be, captures some key (albeit contestable)
assumptions underlying current First Amendment law. See generally infra Part III.B
(discussing assumptions underlying First Amendment doctrine).
12 As we will show, when speech is completely anonymous, rational audiences can
be expected to take the lack of an attributed source into consideration in assessing

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1539 2006-2007

1540

NOTRE

DAME LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:4

better or worse off under a regime that grants strong protection to
anonymous speech, as opposed to one that grants only weak protection, depending upon which effect-the production of more socially
valuable speech, or the production of more harmful, though discounted, speech-predominates. Put another way, speakers' pursuit
of the optimal balance of private costs and benefits in a regime that
protects anonymity may produce outcomes that diverge from the optimal balance of social costs and benefits, as viewed from the standpoint
of the audience. The extent of the divergence is unclear, however,
and thus the implications of the positive analysis standing alone are
indeterminate.
Our normative analysis nevertheless suggests a way of resolving
this indeterminacy. Traditional First Amendment theory suggests two
presumptions that can assist in weighing the relevant costs and benefits of anonymous speech. The first is that the audience for "core"
First Amendment speech is both educated and critical-and thus able
to defend itself, in large part, from the effects of harmful anonymous
speech. 13 This presumption is not empirically based, to be sure, but it
is consonant with versions of democratic theory that assume that citizens are rational and capable of self-government. The second is that
more speech is, in general, better than less, and therefore that measures designed to reduce the quantity or diversity of speech are inherently suspect. To the extent the anonymity option makes otherwise
reluctant speakers more willing to speak, therefore, it is presumptively
a social good, despite some risk that it will induce some harmful
speech as well. Taking these assumptions as touchstones, we advocate
(in the context of claims involving torts such as defamation) a constitutional privilege for anonymous speech, which privilege may be overcome only when the party seeking disclosure of the speaker's identity
the speech's quality and truth value. On the other hand, when the speaker uses a
pseudonym, audiences may not discount the value of the speech very much, perhaps
because they are not aware that the author's name is a pseudonym. But even when
audiences are made aware of this fact, they may (rationally) choose not to discount
pseudonymous speech as much as anonymous speech, on the assumption that the
pseudonymous author's identity is known to what Saul Levmore refers to as a "responsible intermediary." See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191,
2202 (1996). Audiences might also discount pseudonymous speech less because

pseudonyms sometimes serve a trademark-like function of signaling a degree of quality control. See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1419; Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1194.
13 The Supreme Court has been willing to indulge more paternalistic assumptions about the audience in the context of commercial speech. Consumer protection
is an accepted rationale for regulating commercial speech. See, e.g., Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (noting that commercial speech may
be regulated to ensure that it is not false and misleading).
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which the trier of fact may conclude
presents sufficient evidence from
tort at issue, and that disclosure of
that the speaker has committed the
the alleged victim's case. Laws
that person's identity is essential to
of political speech, on the other
requiring disclosure in the context
more difficult to justify; in the conhand, should be (if anything) even
the assumption of a rational, crittext of commercial speech, however,
paternalistic assumptions and thus
ical audience may give way to more
to compel disclosure.
make it relatively easy for the state
upon which the Supreme
Part I inspects the unstable foundation
anonymously in cases such as
Court has grounded the right to speak
the positive analysis of the
McIntyre and McConnell. Part II presents
of anonymous speech referred to
private and public costs and benefits
the
Part makes use of concepts from
above. Among other things, this
trademarks and copyright) to
law of intellectual property (particularly
surrounding the publication of
illuminate some recurring problems
the case that our two presumpanonymous speech. Part III makes
are firmly grounded in
tions, of rational audiences and more-is-better, Part IV employs the
conventional First Amendment jurisprudence. speech to provide guiof anonymous
positive and normative analyses
to curb anonymous speech (particudance to legislatures attempting
that
and to courts adjudicating cases
larly anonymous speech online)
other
to speak anonymously and
present conflicts between the right
important interests.
I.

THE MANY FACES OF A oNmnayM

the First Amendment protects
The Supreme Court has held that
of that protection is murky. The
anonymous speech, but the scope
McConnell, rely on conflicting
two main decisions, McIntyre and
respond to anonymous or pseudonassumptions about how audiences
assumptions about its value.
ymous speech and, ultimately, conflicting
generated conflicting approaches
The Court's jurisprudence has thus
other important rights.
to balancing such speech against
Speech
McIntyre and the Contributions of Anonymous
on anonymous speech is McInThe leading Supreme Court case
opposing a school tax refertyre.14 Margaret McIntyre wrote handbills
A.

speech.
other cases deal direcdy with anonymous
14 514 U.S. 334 (1995). Three
150
U.S.
536
Stratton,
of
Village
of New York, Inc. v.
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
prohibiting door-toordinance
an
of
(2002), the Court addressed the constitutionality
Court struck down the

from the mayor's office. The
door canvassing without a permit
tailored to the
was overbroad and not sufficiently
it
ordinance on the grounds that
168-69. The
at
Id.
privacy.
and crime and protecting
interests of preventing fraud
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endum and then handed them out to people attending public
meetings to discuss the tax. She omitted her name from some of the
handbills, instead signing them: "'CONCERNED PARENTS AND
TAX PAYERS [sici .' ,5

Responding to a complaint from a school offi-

cial, the Ohio Elections Commission fined McIntyre $100 for violating
an Ohio law forbidding distribution of any publication promoting a
ballot issue unless it contained the "name and residence" of the person "who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor[el."' 6 McIntyre
appealed, and the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Ohio law did
not violate the First Amendment, since the minor burden on speakers
posed by the law was more than offset by the state interest in helping
voters assess the "validity" of campaign literature and "identify[ing]
those who engage in fraud, libel or false advertising."17 The Supreme
Court struck down the Ohio law on a 7-2 vote, with Justice Scalia and
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting. The Court held that "an author's
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.""'
The Court rested its decision on two grounds. The first ground
was instrumental: Protecting anonymity is necessary to induce some
authors to contribute valuable information to the marketplace of
ideas. The Court lauded the contributions anonymous and pseudonymous authors have made to the "progress of mankind,"1 9 citing political examples such as the FederalistPapers and literary examples such as
Court cited McIntyre for the proposition that the permit requirement would have a
.pernicious effect" in part because it "necessarily results in a surrender of... anonymity." Id. at 166; see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182,
199-200 (1999) (striking down state law requiring people circulating petitions dealing with issue referenda to wear identification badges); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 428-29 (1963) (recognizing a right to anonymous association); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 80 (1960) (striking down a Los Angeles ordinance that prohibited all
anonymous handbilling and holding that Los Angeles could employ means less
restrictive of freedom of expression in protecting its citizens from fraud).
15 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
16 Id. at 338 & n.3.
17 Id. at 340.
18 Id. at 342; see Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the
Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 117, 120 (1996) (arguing that the Court treated "anonymity as
the speaker's rightful choice" in McIntyre).
19 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas cited historical
examples to show that the Framers believed in protecting anonymous speech. Id. at
370 (Thomas, J, concurring). He concluded: "[Wlhether certain types of expression
have 'value' today has little significance; what is important is whether the Framers in
1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently valuable to deserve the protection of the

Bill of Rights." Id.
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20
Court's opinion focused on
Mark Twain and George Eliot. The
to remain anonymous: fear of
benign reasons motivating speakers
avoid social ostracism, the wish to
retaliation or reprisal, the desire to
distort the
21
fear that the audience's biases will
protect privacy, or the
that
22
grandiloquently concluded
23
meaning of the work. The Court

tyranny of the majority"
"[a]nonymity is a shield from the

without

suffer.
which public discourse would certainly
anonymous speech
The Court's second ground for protecting
anonymous is
remain
decision to
was authorial autonomy. An author's
author gen"an
of content, and
an exercise of autonomy over choice
not to disclose his or her true idenerally is free to decide whether or
"intrusive"
tity." 24

The Court labeled identification requirements

reveal "the content of [their]
because they require authors to2 5
In essence, the Court treated the
thoughts on a controversial issue."
as an editorial judgment like any
decision to rem~iin anonymous
one's name no different than
other, which makes choosing to omit
or to include serial commas.
choosing to omit an opposing viewpoint
name with all other editoOnce the Court equated the author's
was clear. If an author's name is
rial content, the outcome of McIntyre
it logically follows that the statute in McIntyre was a content.content,"
particular content (i.e., the
based regulation. The statute required
26
an author's work. Moreover, the
in
included
be
to
name)
author's
only by publications that dealt with
statute's application was triggered
.
candidates) 27 Ultimately, howparticular subjects (ballot issues or
requirement was unconstituever, Ohio's content-based disclosure
at "the core of the protection
tional only because it regulated speech
28 Handbills that seek to influence
afforded by the First Amendment.
speech" entitled to every bit as
"issue-based elections" are "political
as speech advocating the election
much First Amendment protection
20

Id. at 341 n.4 (majority opinion).

noted that the right may be particularly
21 Id. at 341-42. The Court further
Id. at 342.
who criticize oppressive practices.
important for "persecuted groups"
22 Id. at 342 n.5.
that protection of anonymity is there23 Id. at 357. Indeed, the Court concluded
the First Amendbehind the Bill of Rights, and of
fore consistent with the "purpose
their ideas
individuals from retaliation-and
ment in particular: to protect unpopular
Id.
an intolerant society."
from suppression-at the hand of
341.
at
24 Id.
25 Id. at 355.
(West 1988)
REv. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A)
26 Id. at 338 n.3 (citing OHio
in 1995)).
at
(amended and recodified at § 3517.20
(West 1988) (amended and recodified
3599.09(A)
§
ANN.
27 Oulo REv. CODE
§ 3517.20 in 1995).
28 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-46.
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of a candidate.2 9 Indeed, the Court asserted that "[n]o form of
speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than Mrs.
McIntyre's.""o
A content-based regulation of core political speech almost never
survives strict scrutiny, and the regulation in McIntyre was no exception. The Court rejected Ohio's assertions that the regulation was
necessary to "provid[e] the electorate with relevant information" and
to prevent fraud and libel. 3 1 The Court saw no reason to think that
McIntyre's handbill was misleading, essentially glossing over the impli32
cation that others supported the arguments made in the handbill.
Moreover, the Court did not think that McIntyre's name was likely to
be useful to the electorate in evaluating her message, noting that the
name of the author of a "handbill written by a private citizen who is
not known to the recipient" is likely to "add little, if anything, to the
reader's ability to evaluate the document's message." 33 The mere possibility that an author's name might, in some cases, "buttress or undermine the argument in a document" was insufficient. 34 The Court also
rejected as insufficient Ohio's second asserted interest-the "ancillary
benefit" of deterring and detecting fraud and libel. 35 Although the

Court believed that this interest "carries special weight during election
campaigns," it found that the interest could be protected effectively
6
through direct prohibitions on fraud and libel.3

Despite the Court's praise of anonymous speech throughout
McIntyre, the opinion acknowledges that First Amendment protection
is not absolute.3 7 The Court envisions a balancing process to ensure
that speakers remain accountable for fraud, libel, or other unlawful
acts. Indeed, dictum in McIntyre suggests several types of identification requirements that might survive constitutional scrutiny. 3 These
include requirements applicable "only to the activities of candidates
29

Id. at 347.

30

Id.

31 Id. at 348.
32 Id. at 337.
33 Id. at 348-49.
34 Id. at 348.
35 Id. at 350-51.
36 Id. at 349-50.
37 See id. at 358 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that the State may "in
other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its
identity").
38 Id. at 351. Justice Scalia notes, correctly, that the Court's indication that a
.more limited identification requirement" might be upheld is inconsistent with its
application of "exacting scrutiny" in McIntyre. Id. at 380-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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-19 requirements applicable only to
and their organized supporters,
40
to
"elections of public officers," and requirements applicable only
41
Court
the
Although
election.
"leaflets distributed on the eve of an
possible explanation is that the
one
never fully explains this dictum,
precisely because anonymity
right to speak anonymously is qualified
information that has significant
sometimes deprives the audience of
decision acknowledges that an
communicative value. The Court's
to the communicative impact
author's identity, as content, contributes
42
in the realm of political rhetoric a
of her work. As the Court notes,
component of many attempts to
speaker's identity "is an important
"critthat author identity helps
43
44 But this
persuade." The Court also concedes
of the writing."
ics in evaluating the quality and significance
be even more impormay
name
concession suggests that an author's
and stripping an author's identity
tant than other types of "content,"
of an important clue to unlockfrom a work may deprive the audience
ing its meaning.

speaker autonomy and
Why are the interests in protecting
of ideas enough tojustify,
increasing contributions to the marketplace
speakers of informadepriving
in the name of the First Amendment,
interpret a work? Author idention that might be needed to correctly
to the interpretation of a
tity, the Court asserts, is not "indispensable"
based on its theory regardwork. 45 The Court reaches this conclusion
speech. Toward the end of the
ing audience response to anonymous
that the "inherent worth of the
McIntyre opinion, the Court posits
informing the public does not
speech in terms of its capacity for
46 However, this conclusion
depend upon the identity of its source."
will use other clues of qualrests on the assumption that the audience
39

Id. at 351 (majority opinion).

40

Id.

41

Id.

at 352.

of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Robert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConcept
640
v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine
speaker,
a
of
status
social
the
to
attend as carefully
(1990) ("In most circumstances we
of her
words, as we do to the bare content
her
of
context
social
the
and to
communication.").
43, 56
City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S.
43 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (quoting
(1994)).
is "'helpful
n.11 (noting that a source's identity
44 Id. at 342 n.5; see also id. at 348
(Sup. Ct.
996
978,
N.Y.S.2d
v. Duryea, 351
in evaluating ideas'" (quoting New York
1974))).
45 Id. at 342 n.5.
U.S. 765, 777
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
46 Id. at 353 (quoting First Nat'l
(1978)).
42
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ity and significance to play the role that might in some cases be played
by author identity.
The Court's explanation of the process by which the audience
"interprets" author anonymity is oblique. As noted above, the Court
suggests that the identity of an author unknown to the audience
would add few clues to the meaning of the text. Yet even where an
author's identity would be helpful to an audience, the Court believes
that the audience is skilled enough to interpret most messages without
it. The Court quotes with approval the following statement from New
York v. Duyea4 7:
"Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing ....
They
can see it is anonymous. They can evaluate its anonymity along with

its message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read
that message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them to
48
decide what is 'responsible,' what is valuable, and what is truth."

The quote makes several contestable assumptions about the audience of anonymous speech. Crucially, it presumes the existence of an
audience united by common values and habits of interpretation. But
the audience for anonymous speech is essentially a construct. The
Court did not consult poll data or experts before deciding that Margaret McIntyre's handbill would not mislead or fool the voters who
received it. Instead, the Court simply stated that "[t] here is no suggestion that the text of [McIntyre's] message was false, misleading, or
libelous," even though the fact that it was signed "Concerned Parents
and Taxpayers" might well lead one to assume that numerous citizens
had joined in the handbill. 49 What the Court seems to be suggesting
is that anyone who read McIntyre's message critically would not be
misled-taking into account the facts that the author was unknown,

that anyone could adopt the label "Concerned Parents and Taxpayers," and that the text had grammatical errors, an unsophisticated
graphic design, and a clear bias on a controversial local political issue.
Thus the McIntyre Court appears to be imputing, in the name of
the First Amendment, certain qualities to the audience of anonymous
speech. Ostensibly this audience is composed of common men, who
can exercise common sense to give the proper weight to anonymous
speech. The "common man" in the audience presumably will use the
tone and style of the text, the context in which it appears, and the
persuasiveness of its arguments in deciding "what is 'responsible,'
47
48
49

351 N.YS.2d 978.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348 n.l (quoting Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 996)).
Id. at 337.
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50 The Court portrays this as simwhat is valuable, and what is truth."
ideas determining the value of
ply an instance of the marketplace of
evidence about how any particular
ideas5 1 and demands no empirical
anonymous speech.
audience member would interpret
response to anonymous speech is
The Court's theory of audience
never
McIntyre decision, but the Court
a critical underpinning of the
implicitly
Court
of the theory. The
spells out the full implications
always gauge the value of anonyacknowledges that audiences cannot
and reaindividual audience members
mous speech; as a result, both
be harmed. Moreover, the Court
soned discourse as a whole may
not shield abusive speakers from
recognizes that anonymity should
outto speak anonymously may be
accountability, and that the right
But the Court gives little guidance
weighed by other important rights.
52 Instead, the Court merely
about how to calibrate the balance.
ability to discount anonymous
expresses faith in the audience's
any potential harm that might
speech, reducing (but not eliminating)
flow from it.

B.

Speech
McConnell and the Dangers of Anonymous

faculties of the audience for
The Court's faith in the critical
53
McConnell
to waver in McConnell.
anonymous speech appeared
Bipartisan
the
of
of several provisions
addressed the constitutionality
,54 and, in the process, clouded
(BCRA)
5 5 The
Campaign Reform Act of 2002
speak anonymously.
to
right
constitutional
the
the status of
close loopholes in existing campaign
BCRA's main purpose was to
"soft money" loophole in the Fedfinance regulations, especially the
Id. at 349 n.l1.
that the Ohio
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, argued
51 justice Scalia's dissent,joined
of the
identification
idea, but merely requires
law "forbids the expression of no
J., dis(Scalia,
378
at
Id.
in the electoral context."
speaker when the idea is uttered
Framers
the
that
evidence
of
absence
that in the
senting). The dissent further argued
should defer
protect anonymous speech, the Court
to
Amendment
First
the
intended
process. Id.
electoral
the states in regulating the
to the "long-accepted practices" of
this newly
of
shape
50

to work out the
52 See id. at 381 ("It may take decades elections field.").
the
in
even
expanded right-to-speak-incognito,
53 540 U.S. 93, 126-28, 193-97 (2003).
of 2
(codified primarily in scattered sections
54 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
Act.
referred to as the McCain-Feingold
and 47 U.S.C.). The Act is also commonly
Publius, and I Approve This Message: The
Am
I
55 See, e.g., Richard M. Cardillo, Note,
Post-McConnell, 80 NOTRE
Pamphleteering
Baffling and Conflicted State of Anonymous
lower
the confusion McConnell created in
(detailing
(2005)
DAME L. REV. 1929, 1941
courts).
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eral Election Campaign Act (FECA). 56 However, the BCRA also
imposed various disclosure requirements whose effect was to limit cer57
tain types of anonymous political speech during election campaigns.
Largely ignoring McIntyre, the Supreme Court upheld most of these
disclosure requirements, often relying on paternalistic assumptions
about the imagined audience at which this anonymous campaign
speech would be targeted.
A bit of background is necessary to understand the BCRA's disclosure requirements. In 1971, the FECA 58 began requiring sponsors of
political ads expressly advocating election or defeat of a candidate to
disclose their names to the Federal Election Commission (FEC).59
The FEC construed the disclosure provision to apply only when an
election ad contained "'magic words' such as 'Elect John Smith' or
'Vote Against Jane Doe."' 60 The FECA did not require sponsors of
"issue ads" to disclose their identities.6 1 Issue ads do not expressly
advocate election or defeat of a candidate. Not only were issue ads
exempt from the disclosure requirements of the FECA; they were also
exempt from provisions that capped the source and amount of funds
that could be spent on express advocacy. 62 This meant that anyone
who wanted to sponsor an ad advocating for or against a candidate
could avoid the FECA's disclosure and spending limitations as long as
the sponsor was clever enough to avoid using the "magic words." 63 As
64
a result, issue ads meant to influence elections proliferated.
One of the chief goals of the BCRA was to curb perceived abuses
that flowed from the FECA's deferential treatment of issue ads. 65 To
achieve this goal, the BCRA broadened the FECA's disclosure require56 McConnel4 540 U.S. at 123. The FECA limits the amount of contributions
made to influence federal election campaigns ("hard money" contributions); these
limits, however, do not apply to contributions of" 'nonfederal money'-also known as
'soft money'-to political parties for activities intended to influence state or local
elections." Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A)(i) (2000)).
57 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. §§ 434 & note, 441d (Supp. IV 2004); 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp.
IV 2004).
58 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).

59

McConnelL 540 U.S. at 126 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976)).

60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 121-22. Express advocacy must be financed with "hard money," that is,
"funds that are subject to the Act's disclosure requirements and source and amount
limitations." Id. at 122. Prior to the BCRA, "issue ads" could be financed with "soft
money," that is, funds not subject to the FECA's limitations. Id. at 122-26.
63 Id. at 126.
64 Id. at 127-28.

65

Id. at 194.
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as "electioneering comments to apply to a new category of ads known
are "broadcast, cable,
munications." Electioneering communications
refer to a candidate for federal
or satellite communication[s]" that
election or the thirty days
office in the sixty days prior to the general
66
this new category of elec67
prior to the primary. The BCRA subjected
disclosure requirements.
to "significant
tioneering communications

the electioneering proviJustices Stevens and O'Connor upheld Ginsburg, and Souter 68
Justices Breyer,
sions in a decision joined by
a relatively hostile attitude toward
The McConnell majority revealed
begin with, the McConnell majority
anonymous political speech. To
ads during election campaigns
agreed that the proliferation of issue
the
this was at least in part because
was a problem and implied that
69 For example, the Court noted that
ads were often anonymous.
to

. . . often used misleading names
sponsors of "so-called issue ads
the Court ques-

70
suggests,
conceal their identity." As this sentence issue ads and the contrisponsor
tioned both the motives of those who
The objectionable ads were not
debate.
bution they make to public

"true issue ad[s"

71

support or defeat
because their sponsors sought to

"magic words" denoting express
a candidate, albeit without using the
ad would address a public 7 contro2
advocacy; presumably a true issue
way to particular candidates. Even
versy without connecting it in any
been readily obvious to potential
though the deception would have
of the sponsors because they
voters, the Court denigrated the motives
objective: to support or defeat a parwere attempting to disguise their
ticular candidate.
the motives of the sponsors
Furthermore, the Court denigrated
to remain anonymous. The Court
precisely because they often chose
themselves from the scrutiny of
criticized them as attempting to "hide
argument that this would impair
the voting public," and accepted the
choices in the political marketthe public's ability "to make informed
must be
(West Supp. IV 2004). They also
66 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f) (3) (A) (i)
elecrelevant
the
within
50,000 viewers or listeners
targeted to an audience of at least
in section
appears
which
communications,
torate. This definition of electioneering
the FECA.
of
304
section
amends
201 of the BCRA,
of electionThe BCRA also limits the funding
67 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.
and unions. Id.
eering communications by corporations
of the
O'Connor delivered the opinion
and
68 Id. at 114-224 (Justices Stevens
and
Ginsburg,
Souter,
I and II, in which Justices
Court with respect to BCRA Tides
Breyer joined).
69 Id. at 126-29.
70 Id. at 128 (emphasis added).

71
72

Id. at 193.
Id. at 126.
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anonymous ads that would
place."7 3 What is it about these kinds of
political choices? The
impair the public's ability to make informed
ads were "dubious and misleadCourt endorsed the notion that the
which they were aired suging"74 because the pseudonyms under
their views. As an example, the
gested a broad base of support for
Air,' which ran ads in the 2000
Court cited "'Republicans for Clean
was actually an organization
Republican Presidential primary, [and]
' 75 One might quibble that this is
consisting of just two individuals.
calling herself "Concerned
little different than Margaret McIntyre
deemed not to be misleadParents and Taxpayers," which the Court
pseudonym is not much difing. 76 Certainly the nature of the chosen
ferent here than it was in McIntyre.
enough to see through
Why should the voting public be smart
message more weight but not
Margaret McIntyre's attempt to give her
tactic when used by "Republismart enough to see through the same
happened to the argument
cans for Clean Air"? Moreover, whatever
is just like any other editorial
that the choice to remain anonymous
McConnell Court gave no deferchoice an author might make? The
it noted that many "mysterious
ence to this editorial choice when
names" to increase the ads'
groups" ran issue ads under "misleading
any
7 7 No longer was this a choice of content like
effectiveness.
trick.
other, 78 but was instead just a dirty campaign
both the motives behind
The Court's hostile assumptions about
ads led it to conclude that
and the importance of anonymous political
were constitutional. The
the BCRA's various disclosure requirements
some of these assumpCourt's scrutiny of BCRA section 201 illustrates
anyone who disrequire
to
tions. 79 Section 201 amended the FECA
73 Id. at 197.
curiam opinion with approval).
74 Id. (citing the district court's per
75 Id. at 128.
76 See supra Part I.A.
3
the Court was also concerned that
77 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 128 n.2 . Admittedly,
candidates and political parties to circumvent
these issue ads were being used by
FECA limitations. Id. at 129.
514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995).
78 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
in the Court's treatment of section 504
79 These same assumptions are mirrored
Act of 2002 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)
of the BCRA. Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Id.
affects the right to speak anonymously.
(Supp. IV 2004). Section 504 directly
keep
to
broadcasters
require
Act of 1934 to
Section 504 amends the Communications
of a
broadcast time "made by or on behalf
purchase
to
requests
all
of
public records
prodisclosure
Id. More sweepingly, the
legally qualified candidate for public office."
relatmessage
a
[]
time to "communicate
vision also applies to purchasers of broadcast
Id. (emphasis added). In essence,
importance."
national
of
ing to any political matter
requirements: (1) the candidate request
section 504 contains three disclosure
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burses, or makes a contract to disburse, $10,000 dollars or more per
calendar year on electioneering communications to file a statement
with the FEC.80 This statement must identify, among other things, all
those who contributed $1000 or more to the disbursement. Although
the Court recognized that this disclosure requirement might, as
applied, interfere with the First Amendment right of association,8 ' it
gave no apparent weight to the potential for interference with anonymous political speech. Indeed, the Court concluded that section
201's disclosure requirements "d[ol not prevent anyone from speaking."82 The Court found the requirement was amply supported by

three "important state interests," namely, "providing the electorate
with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any
appearance thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce
3
more substantive electioneering restrictions."8'
The Court's reliance on the "informational rationale" is troub8
ling. 4 An author's name will almost always provide relevant informarequirement, which affects requests "made by or on behalf of" candidates for public

office; (2) the election message requirement, which affects requests to broadcast
information referring to a "legally qualified candidate" or to any election to Federal
office; and (3) the issue request requirement, which affects requests that refer to any
"national legislative issue of public importance," or any "political matter of national
importance." Id. The Court concluded that the section 504 provision was facially
constitutional under "any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including
that of heightened scrutiny." See McConnel, 540 U.S. at 245. The Court's opinion
focused primarily on the burden the regulation placed on broadcasters, rather than
the burden it placed on would-be anonymous speakers. See id. at 359 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing examples from the majority opinion to argue that "Itlhe Court
approaches § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees").
The Court reasoned that section 504's burdens are similar to those already imposed
on broadcasters by Federal Communications Commission regulations. Id. at 245
(majority opinion). Essentially ignoring the rights of the would-be anonymous speakers, the Court refused to apply exacting scrutiny to the disclosure requirement. Id. at
141. But see Wis. Right to Life Inc. v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016, 1017-18 (2006) (per
curiam) (allowing an "as-applied" challenge to the disclosure provisions by a self-proclaimed "grassroots lobbying organization" to go forward).
80 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f) (2) (A), (B), (D) (Supp. IV 2004).
81 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 197-98.
82 Id. at 201 (alterations in original) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d
176, 241 (D.D.C. 2003)).
83 Id. at 196.
84 Raleigh Levine notes the Court's growing reliance on the informational rationale in the electoral context: "(T] he Court remains committed to the long-ingrained
national conception that the electorate should consist of informed, intelligent voters,
and ... the Court has become increasingly concerned that voters may not exercise
their right to vote in the manner that the Court prefers." Raleigh Hannah Levine,
The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court'sElectoralSpeech Cases, 54 CASE
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alone is sufficient to
tion to the audience, and if that interest
the right has little meanovercome the right to speak anonymously,
in his dissent, the McIntyre
ing.8 5 Moreover, as Justice Thomas noted
that the "simple interest in providCourt explicitly rejected the notion
information ... justif [ied] a state
ing voters with additional relevant
statements or disclosures she would
requirement that a writer make
15 5 2

8
otherwise omit."

6

..R

VI W[

O .

information to
Certainly the interest in providing

authors to make other types
the audience would not justify requiring
it
ad might be more informative if
of content additions. A political
somberly
read
and its message was
were broadcast in black and white
cerattempting to require this would
by an announcer, but a statute
with political speech. Nor,
tainly be struck down as an interference
be constitutionally justified if it
one suspects, would the government
an index, even if this would make
were to require all books to include
them more informative.
solely on the informational
The McConnell Court did not rely
disclosure requirements, howrationale in upholding section 201's
to make a credible argument
ever, and for that reason it is possible
In McConnell, the Justices in
distinguishing McConnell from McIntyre.
the argument that the disclosure
the majority gave great weight to
corruption and prevent circumrequirements were necessary to deter
87
regulations. The campaign reguvention of other campaign finance
speech in support of a ballot
lation in McIntyre affected anonymous
the
behalf of an issue. By contrast,
referendum, i.e., advertising on
candia
of
advertising by supporters
regulations in McConnell affected
if elected, would "repay" his
date, creating a danger that the candidate,
Thus, the anticorruption ratiosupporters with favorable legislation.
are arguably stronger in
nale and anticircumvention rationales
in insuring
Levine notes that historically the interest
W. Res. L. REV. 225, 243 (2003).
239-40.
at
Id.
tests.
informed voters helped justify literacy
3 ELECMcConnell v. FEC and Disclosure,
Commentary,
Garrett,
85 See Elizabeth
could
rationale
(noting that McConnelfs informational
TiON L.J. 237, 240-42 (2004)
issue elections).
also be applied in the context of
and dissenting in
(Thomas, J., concurring in part
276
86 McConnell, 540 U.S. at
348 (1995)); see
334,
U.S.
514
Elections Comm'n,
part) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio
used to "punish a
218 (1966) (striking down a law
also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
rejecting the
and
an editorial on election day"
newspaper editor" for "publishing
"from conpublic
the
means of protecting
argument that the statute was a reasonable
18, at 155
note
supra
Tien,
countercharges");
inforfusive [sic] last-minute charges and
little
very
McIntyre would have provided
the
(stating that the identity of Margaret
Thus,
McIntyre.
"[t]here [wa]s no victim in
vicmation to her audience and thus
only
the
because
speech
virtues of anonymous
Court could wax poetic about the
tim would be discourse itself.").
(majority opinion).
87 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-44
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law at issue in McIntyre
McConnell than McIntyre. Even so, the Ohio
in providing voters more inforwas not justified solely by an interest
interest in preventing fraud and
mation; Ohio had also invoked its
as inadequate to justify infringing the
libel, but the Court rejected 8this
8
right to speak anonymously.
weight to the state interThe McConnell Court not only gave more
the McIntyre Court; it also tacitly
est in preventing corruption than
of a candidate makes less of a conassumed that advertising on behalf
purely to advance an issue.
tribution to public debate than advertising
however, the distinction the Court
As Justice Kennedy pointed out,
89 Often the reason one supattempted to draw is rather arbitrary.
of his views on policy issues.
ports a candidate is precisely because
is indeed greater, and it
Nonetheless, the potential for corruption
requirements were part of a
must be remembered that the disclosure
to
finance reform designed
90 Even
much larger program of campaign
on the political system.
decrease the influence of "big money"
rejected the argument McConnell
so, the McIntyre Court explicitly
law regulated merely the elecseems to adopt, namely, that the Ohio 9
'
toral process rather than pure speech.
McConnell from McIntyre.
Two additional features distinguish
rather than print media. In
First, McConnell dealt with broadcasting
right of "viewers and listhe broadcast context, the First Amendment
trumps broadcasters' First
teners" to receive information sometimes
92
discretion. Broadcasters are
Amendment right to exercise editorial
to ensure that they presubject to extensive government regulation
88 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348-52.
in
J., concurring in part and dissenting
89 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy,
part).
(1976), the
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67
90 Id. at 115 (majority opinion).
to where
'as
information
with
the electorate
Court stated that "disclosure provides
in order
candidate'
the
by
spent
is
it
and how
political campaign money comes from
No.
REP.
H.R.
who seek federal office" (quoting
to aid the voters in evaluating those
92-564, at 4 (1971)).
91 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
Court
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). The Supreme
92 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
candiof
behalf
on
medium
access to the broadcast
to
has even upheld a limited right of
contribution
significant
a
"makes
right of access
dates for federal office; this limited
pubthe
and
the ability of candidates to present,
freedom of expression by enhancing
prothe effective operation of the democratic
for
lic to receive, information necessary
interpretation
FCC's
the
396 (1981) (upholding
cess." CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,
requires
§ 312(a) (7) (Supp. IV 2004), which
U.S.C.
47
Act,
of the Communications
airwaves).
the
to
candidates "reasonable access"
broadcast licensees to give federal
print media.
unconstitutional if applied to the
clearly
This right of access would be
(1974).
256
418 U.S. 241,
See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo,
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n c e . 5"
More to the
of public importa
sent conflicting views on issues
broadcasters to provide the pubpoint, federal law has long required
office and
about candidates for federal
94
lic with adequate information
The
requests for broadcast time.
candidate
of
records
to keep
obligamerely expanded these existing
BCRA, according to the Court,
contemplated
explicitly
9 5
Moreover, the McConnell majority
tions.
different than the audibe
might
that the audience for "documents"
of regto address the constitutionality
96
ence for broadcasts and refused
anonymous speech.
ulation of broadcast
in
by the disclosure requirements
Second, the speakers affected
the
While
corporate entities or unions.
McConnell were primarily
the same
have
held that corporations
Supreme Court has generally
election
of
97
context
its decisions in the
speech rights as individuals,
and other organizations differcampaigns have treated corporations
simply
98
McConnell, on one reading,
99
ently than individual speakers.
decisions in
electoral speech"
applies the logic of prior "corporate
distorting
in limiting "'the corrosive and
finding a compelling interest
with
of wealth that are accumulated
effects of immense aggregations
to
and that have little or no correlation
1 0 0 In other
the help of the corporate form
corporation's political ideas."
the public's support for the
exercise
should not be allowed to
words, corporations and unions
may be
speech
process, and their
"undue influence" on the electoral

(citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (2002)).
93 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 239
give time to
(2000) (requiring broadcasters that
94 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
the same
for
opportunity" to other candidates
candione candidate to provide an "equal
allow
must
(providing that broadcasters
even
office); id. § 315(b) (Supp. III 2003)
(imposing,
315(e)
§
id.
unit charge");
dates to purchase ads at their "lowest
requests"
"candidate
regarding
requirements
prior to passage of the BCRA, disclosure
time).
to purchase
were not
expanded disclosure obligations
95 According to the Court, these
had the
they
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 242, and
unduly burdensome on broadcasters,
239.
at
Id.
broadcasting fairness."
virtue of helping "the public evaluate
96 See id. at 245.
Gas
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see also Pac.
97 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
"Itlhe
that
(asserting
of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n
protected"
in determining whether speech is
decisive
not
identity of the speaker is
organizaother
and
corporations
of
rights
and affirming that the First Amendment
speakers).
tions are equal to those of individual
InstituSpeech, Securities Regulation and an
Corporate
Siebecker,
R.
98 See Michael
(2006)
636-41
48 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 613,
tional Approach to the First Amendment,
cases).
(emphasizing this point and collecting
99 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 258.
494 U.S. 652, 660
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
100 Id. at 205 (quoting Austin
(1990)).

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1554 2006-2007

20073

AUTHORSHIP,

AUDIENCES,

AND

ANONYMOUS

SPEECH

1555

regulated lest it drown out the speech of individual citizens and
impair their ability to choose their representatives.
Even if McConnell and McIntyre are technically distinguishable,
they have a deep theoretical inconsistency. The McConnell Court's
assumptions about both the value of anonymous speech and the ability of the audience to properly interpret it differed markedly from the
assumptions in McIntyre. The McConnell majority seems hostile to
anonymous or pseudonymous speech in the election context. The
McConnell opinion rests on paternalistic notions about the abilities of
voters; as opponents of campaign finance reform have argued, even
the assumption that "money influences outcomes paternalistically
implies that voters cannot sift through various information to make
decisions."1 0 1 McIntyre, on the other hand, assumes voters are savvy
consumers of political information, able to discern the partisan motivations behind campaign literature and make informed decisions
even without knowing the identity of the author. 10 2
C.

Why Anonymity Matters Now

This theoretical inconsistency makes the two decisions unstable
guides for the new challenges presented by anonymous speech on the
Internet. 0 3 McConnell and McIntyre both involved anonymous speech
in the physical world, where the ability to be truly anonymous is limited. By contrast, the architecture of the internet makes it easy to
speak anonymously, or at least pseudonymously. 10 4 As a result, there
101 See Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: CampaignFinance,Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA.L. REv. 73, 86 & n.42 (2004) (citing opponents of reform).
102 As communications theorist ten Ang has observed, the social construction of
an "audience" is a mechanism of exercising power over that audience. IN ANG, DESPEIRATELY SEEIUNG TnE AUDIENCE 7 (1991). Yet the "audience" itself remains "an imaginary entity, an abstraction constructed from the vantage point of [an) institution [)."
Id. at 2. Ang observes: "[M]asses are illusory totalities: there are no masses, 'only ways
of seeing people as masses."' Id. (quoting RAYMOND WILLIAMs, CULTURE AND SOCIETv
289 (1961)).
103 This inconsistency is not unique to the anonymous speech issue, and occasionally the Supreme Court will explicitly lay out its paternalistic assumptions about the
audience. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (stating that
the First Amendment does not prevent states from having laws that regulate what
issuers of securities "may write or publish about their wares" because "[s]uch laws are
to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the
exercise of their own volition").
104 Catherine Crump, Note, Data Retention: Privacy, Anonymity, and Accountability
Online, 56 STAN. L. REV. 191, 217 (2003) (contending that the "architecture of real
space" curbs "this unaccountable form of speech" and that "anonymity is substantially
easier to achieve on the Internet").
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ever before using the freedom
are more anonymous speakers than
and bad purposes. Certainly
anonymity provides for both good
more "uninhibited,
Internet anonymity has10 5made public discussion the same time it has
at
but
before,
than ever
robust, and wide-open"
speak
of speakers abusing the right to
number
magnified the
anonymously.
issues come in a variety of
From a legal standpoint, anonymity
types of cases involves a pseudonyguises. One of the most common
to criticize a powerful corporamous speaker who uses the Internet
10 6 The targets of the criticism
tion, institution, or public figure.
defamation, disclosure of trade
retaliate by suing the speaker for
act. Typically, the plaintiff
secrets, or some other allegedly tortious
perhaps identifying him by screen
initiates suit against "John Doe,"
Doe's Internet service provider (ISP)
name, and then subpoenasJohn
10 7 Some plaintiffs pursue 'John Doe"
to disclose his true identity.
against harmful anonymous
suits as their only available remedy
Doe" suits to discover who their
speech; other plaintiffs bring "John
them and silence other critcritics are so they can retaliate against
identity of an anonymous speaker
ics.1 08 If plaintiffs can obtain the
allegation of defamation, the
with nothing more than an unfounded
On the other hand, anoright to speak anonymously is meaningless.
for tortious speech. Thus, courts
nymity cannot be a complete shield
distinguish "cyberSLAPPs" from
are struggling to craft standards to
to disclose their
claims before compelling defendants
legitimate tort
09
identities.'
has involved attempts by the
Another prominent anonymity issue
America (RIAA) to track down
Recording Industry Association of
several courts concluded that the
online copyright infringers. After
provisions of the Digital MillenRIAA could not use the subpoena
ISPs to reveal the identities of
nium Copyright Act (DMCA) to force
had engaged in online copISP subscribers whom 10the RIAA suspected
resorting to the "John Doe"
yright infringement,' the RIAA began
U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
105 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
Lidsky, supranote 10 (discussing attempts
generally
see
discussion,
106 For further
Internet).
to silence anonymous speakers on the
107 Id. at 889.
See
strategic lawsuits against public participation.
108 The term "SLAPP" stands for
ENVTL.
7 PACE
Lawsuits Against Public Participation,
George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic
as a defamation action,

typically brought
L. REV. 3, 3 (1989). A SLAPP is a lawsuit,
of public concern. Id.
matters
on
speech
aimed at silencing legitimate
109 See infra Part IV.B.

512(h), Pub.
concluded that the Copyright Act §
110 Specifically, three courts have
not authordoes
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)),
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877, 2883
for the
conduit
a
as
merely
an ISP that acts
ize the clerk of the court to subpoena
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has
as well."' The RIAA reportedly
procedure in these types of cases
thouthe identities of several
succeeded in compelling ISPs to reveal
1 12 In one of the leading cases, Sony Music Entertainment
sand users.
sharing
Chin concluded that, although file
Inc. v. Does 1-40,1 iJudge
of
entitled to the 'broadest protection'
is "not 'political expression'
114 it is "entitled to 'some level of First Amendthe First Amendment,"
was entitled
Nevertheless, he found the plaintiff
ment protection."
upon (1) a
based
sharers' identities,
to discovery of the alleged file
actionable
of
of a prima facie claim
sufficiently "concrete showing
copyrighted song
16 including "supporting evidence listing the
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downloaded or distributed" and the dates and times of the acts
alleged;1 17 (2) the "specificity of the discovery request"; (3) the
"absence of alternative means" of discovering the users' identities;" 8
(4) the centrality of the need for this information; and (5) in light of
the terms of the users' ISP service agreement, their lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the downloading and distribution of copyrighted works. 119
These two categories of online anonymity cases have garnered
the lion's share of scholarly attention, but anonymity issues arise in
other contexts as well. Congress and the states are attempting to combat spammers who hide behind anonymity to overwhelm targeted
computer servers with millions of e-mails.' 20 The Securities and
Exchange Commission is working desperately to combat securities
fraud committed by anonymous speakers. 1 2' More troublingly, federal and state legislators are passing laws to curb anonymous speech
online. A new federal law makes it a crime for a speaker to use the
Internet to "annoy" someone unless the speaker reveals his or her true
identity. 12 2 A New Jersey bill, if passed, will require any "public forum
Web site" to collect the names and addresses of everyone who posts to
the site.' 2 3 And there are calls for further regulation. John
Siegenthaler, a journalist and former assistant to Attorney General
Robert Kennedy, criticized Congress for enabling and protecting "vol117 Id. at 565.
118 Id. at 564.
119 Id. at 564-67; accord UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does 1-4, No. 06-0652
SBA(EMC), 2006 WL 1343597, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2006); Elektra Entm't
Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289(RWS), 2004 WL 2095581, at * 2-5 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 8, 2004).
120 For a brief discussion of sparn regulation, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material
Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 129, 158-59 (2005).
121 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Michael Pike, Cybergossip or Securities Fraud? Some
First Amendment Guidance in Drawing the Line, WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM, Oct. 2001, at
15, available at 5 No. 5 GLWSLAW 15 (Westlaw).
122 The provision comes from section 113 of the Violence Against Women and
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2006). The section is entitled "Preventing Cyberstalking," and it provides that
whoever utilizes "any device or software that can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by
the Internet," id. § 223(h)(1)(C), "without disclosing his identity and with intent to
annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person ... who receives the communications...
shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
§ 223(a).
123 See Assemb. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at: http://www.
njleg.state.nj .us/2006/Bills/AI500/1327_12.PDF.
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after he was defamed by an
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based on content posted by their users
identity of anonymous defamers.
providers to help uncover the
arguments, it seems clear that
Whatever the merits of Siegenthaler's
will continue to arise, and
legal issues concerning online anonymity
can expect only limited guidance
when they do, courts and legislators
from McConnell and McIntyre.
A POSITIvE

1I.

SPEECH
ANALYSIS OF ANONYMOUS

appears to recognize the true
Neither McIntyre nor McConnell
Speakers may use the shield of anocomplexity of anonymous speech.
some of which may be consistent
nymity for a variety of purposes, only
time, audiences may not accord
with the public good; at the same
as attributed speech, which in turn
anonymous speech as much value
to publish anonymously in the
may affect speakers' decisions whether
to catalogue the costs and benefits
first place. In this Part, we attempt
and audience, as well as the
of anonymous speech, both to speaker
likely to impact both speaker and
strategic considerations that are
in Parts III and IV a method
audience behavior. We will then suggest
and benefits so as to arrive at
for normatively weighing these costs
concrete policy recommendations.
Identity
The Informational Value of Authorial
by noting a curious fact about
We begin our positive analysis
it
speech persists despite the fact that
anonymous speech: Anonymous
nonanonymous speech to speech
is, on average, less valuable than
use speaker identity as an indicaconsumers (audiences) who often
artistic value, or intellectual merit.
tion of a work's likely truthfulness,
necessarily rely upon other indiWithout attribution, audiences must
regard,
than speaker identity. In this
cia, which can be less reliable
used in
trademark
to that of a
attribution serves a function analogous
is
speech
service, whereas anonymous
connection with a product or
work
product: Consumers must
like a generic or nontrademarked
draw reliable
harder, before they can
1 25
harder, sometimes considerably
itself.
product
of the
conclusions about the qualities
A.

30,
Wikipedia 'Biography,'USA TODAY, Nov.
124 John Seigenthaler, Op-Ed., A False
2005, at 1lA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/200511-29-wikipedia-edit-x'htm"
Lastowka,
74; Heymann, supra note 2, at 1378;
125 See Fisk, supra note 2, at 62-64,
(observ(1993)
1-2
OWNERS
AND
ROSE, AUTHORS
supra note 2, at 1179; see also MARK
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To illustrate, suppose that you encounter an anonymous pamphlet attributing some moral failing to the President of the United
States. Depending on how well or how poorly the allegations mesh
with your background beliefs and assumptions about the President's
character, you assign some implicit probability to the veracity of the
allegations.1 2 6 You will also look to other indicia to gauge the truth of
the allegation, e.g., the professional quality of the pamphlet, whether
it contains misspellings and grammatical errors, and the like. Suppose that, on the basis of all this evidence, you conclude that the
probability that the allegations are true is 50%. Now suppose that, in
addition to the other indicia of truth or falsity, you know the speaker's
identity. First assume the speaker is someone whose integrity you
know to be impeccable: George, the modern-day equivalent of Parson
ing that "[tihe name of the author becomes.., a kind of brand name, a recognizable
sign that the cultural commodity will be of a certain kind and quality" and noting that
"copyright... helps to produce and affirm the very identity of the author as author").
To understand the analogy, imagine a world with no trademarks, i.e., without unique
symbols that identify differentiated products or services. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(2000) (defining a trademark as "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.

. .

used by a person . . .to identify and distinguish his or her goods,

including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown"). You enter a convenience store to buy a soft drink and are immediately confronted with several cans or
bottles all stamped with the generic word "Cola." Different firms produce these different drinks, using different formulas, and each tastes slightly different. In fact, you
may have a favorite, but there is no way to tell which is which without sampling the
goods until you find the one you like the best. In the real world, trademarks come to
the rescue by reducing the cost of searching among differentiated goods for the ones
that contain the specific characteristics you value the most. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(THwro) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 9 cmts. b-c (1995). Trademarks also encourage
producers to invest in quality control. Consumers will rely upon trademarks as source
identifiers only if the trademarked product has roughly the same characteristics each
time a consumer encounters it. Trademark owners therefore have an interest in
maintaining consistent quality in order to develop and preserve customer goodwill.
See id. As long as quality remains constant, consumers who prefer the taste of CocaCola to Pepsi can readily find the product that satisfies their preference, and vice
versa. We argue above that the author's identity performs a trademark-like function
of enabling speech consumers to draw inferences about, and speech producers to
invest in promoting, the quality of expressive works.
126 See, e.g., Linda Simon et al., Trivialization:The ForgottenMode of DissonanceReduction, 68J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCs-IOL. 247, 256-59 (1995) (discussing ways in which
people approach new information that relates to existing beliefs, so as to reduce cognitive dissonance). Consider, for example, the allegation that former President William Clinton had an adulterous relationship with a famous singer. The same
allegation would be less credible if made about President George W. Bush or President Jimmy Carter.
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Weems's "I cannot tell a lie" George Washington.12 7 Given this new
piece of information, you would change your probability-of-truth estimate from 50% to, say, 90%. (Changing it to 100% might be taking
things too far; it is possible, after all, that George, though honest, is
mistaken.) Alternatively, assume you know the speaker to be Cretan, a
pathological liar.1 28 Armed with this information, you would alter
your probability estimate downward, say to 10%. A third possibility is
that knowledge of the speaker's identity would provide you with no
useful information at all; the speaker is unknown to you, and his credibility is not important enough for you to investigate further. On these
facts, knowledge of the speaker's identity does not change your ex ante
probability estimate of 50%. Reflection therefore suggests that knowledge of the speaker's identity does not always matter to you; but that
in some nontrivial class of cases, not knowing the author's identity
could mislead you into either over- or underestimating the statement's truth value.. 2 9 We must also consider that the speaker is aware
that disclosing his identity might discount the credibility of his message. So once again, consider the three possible speaker-types: one
speaker whose identity, if revealed, would cause you to revise your
127 Mason Locke Weems published the first edition of his hagiographical biography of Washington anonymously around 1800, the year after Washington's death.
Weems added his name to later editions. The fifth edition, published in 1806, added
the fictional story about young George Washington and the cherry tree. See MASON
LOCKE. WEEMS, THE LIFE AND MEMORABLE ACTIONS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 9

(5th ed.

1806).
128 Although none of the works of the ancient Cretan philosopher Epimenides
survive, the so-called Epimenides Paradox that is attributed to him consists of the
statement "AB] Cretans are liars." Technically, the Paradox dissolves unless
Epimenides is the only member of the set of Cretans. See RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN,
WHAT IS THE NAME OF THIS BOOK? 214-15 (1978). A cleaner version of the paradox is
the sentence "'Iam now lying.'" See id. at 215.
129 Bayes's Theorem can be used to revise an initial probability estimate on the
basis of additional observations. See MICHAEL 0. FINtKESTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAwY'Es 75-77 (2d ed. 2001). To illustrate, suppose that your initial estimate
is that statement S has a 50% chance of being true and a 50% chance of being false.
Suppose further that there are five possible speakers, Alice, Bill, Claire, Dan, and
Edna; that four of the five (Alice through Dan) always speak the truth; and that the
remaining possible speaker, Edna, tells the truth 75% of the time. On these assumptions, we can analyze the problem as follows:
P(X) = ex ante probability that S is true = .50
P(X.E) = probability that S is true, given that Edna is the speaker = to be
determined
P(E.X) = probability that Edna is the speaker, given that S is true = .15
P(NOT-X) = ex ante probability that S is not true = .50

P(E.NOT-X) = probability that Edna is the speaker, given that X is not true =

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1561 2006-2007

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

1562

[VOL.

82:4

probability-of-truth estimate upward; a second whose identity, if
revealed, would cause you to reduce that probability; and a third the
revelation of whose identity would have no effect. The first speaker
clearly has a motive to reveal his identity, because in doing so he
enhances the likelihood that his message will be believed. The fact
that the actual speaker has chosen not to reveal therefore suggests
either that (1) the actual speaker is not, in fact, the first (truthful)
speaker; or (2) the speaker has other reasons, such as fear of retaliation, to keep his identity secret (more on this below).13° By contrast,
the speaker with the reputation for dishonesty or poor quality work
has an obvious motive to keep her identity a secret, because in doing
so she may increase the likelihood that people will believe her statement or overrate her work product. (Of course, she, like the wellreputed speaker, may have other reasons to keep her identity a
secret.) As for the third possible speaker, whose identity means nothing to you, presumably the revelation of his identity would influence
some readers-those who, unlike you, are familiar with him-either
to believe or disbelieve his statement, but you have no way of knowing
which effect would predominate. In the abstract, therefore, it is diffiBayes's Theorem states that:
P(E IX) P(X)
P(EIX)P(X) + P(EINOT-X)P(NOT-X)

P(X.E)
-

(.15)(.5)
(.15) (.5)+(1) (.5)
=.130

Thus, knowing that Edna is the speaker decreases one's probability of truth estimate

from .5 to .13. Knowing that one of the other possible speakers was the actual speaker
would, of course, increase the probability estimate to 1.0. Alternatively, suppose that
there is one chance in a million (.000001) that Edna is the speaker, given that S is
true, and two chances in a million (.000002) that Edna is the speaker, given that X is
not true. Applying Bayes's Theorem reduces the probability of truth estimate from .5
to 1/3.

Note also that a reader who knows that a work is anonymous rationally will take
the lack of an attributed source into consideration in evaluating the work's probable

truth or quality. If the work provides some clues as to the speaker's reasons for publishing anonymously, the reader may be able to assess whether the speaker is more
likely to fall into the "George" or the "Cretan" category. See infra Part IB for discussion of the reasons, good and bad, for publishing anonymously. But the reader may
be uncertain how to interpret the clues, or may err in interpreting those clues. Alternatively, if the reader is unable to discern or presume whether "good" or "bad" reasons for publishing anonymously predominate, the rational inference is to accord

anonymity no weight at all. Either way, there is a risk that the reader will over- or
underestimate the work's truth or quality, absent source attribution.
130

See infra notes 160-78 and accompanying text.
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cult to tell whether you should accord the statement less weight than
you otherwise might, simply by virtue of its being anonymous; one
rational strategy might be to consider, on the basis of textual or other
evidence, precisely why the speaker at issue may have chosen anonymity.13 I In the following subpart, we will consider in greater depth what
these reasons for remaining anonymous might be; first, however, we
respond to some possible objections to our approach thus far.
The first objection to our equation of anonymous speech with
nontrademarked products is that, as Laura Heymann points out,
trademark law permits the underlying producer of a good to remain
anonymous: As long as a mark conveys the message that the product
emanates from a unique source, it is irrelevant that consumers know
the identity of that source.1 32 Relatively few beer drinkers may care,
for example, that a firm known as The Boston Beer Company, Inc.
produces the beer bearing the trademark "Samuel Adams"; the trademark is all they need to know to obtain a beer of predictable quality.
Similarly, readers of detective novels may not be very interested in
learning that the original name of the author who wrote under the
pen name "Ed McBain" was Salvatore Lombino; 3 3 his pseudonym,
like a trademark, conveys useful information even while his true identity remains unknown to most readers. A trademark might therefore
be more analogous to an author's pseudonym than to his true identity. His true identity would in turn be more like a company's "trade
name," that is, the name under which the source company does business, 13 4 which need not be identical with its trademark. This objection is not fatal to our analysis, however. Presumably, knowledge of an
author's true identity (or of a producer's trade name) in addition to
the author's pseudonym (or a product's trademark) provides additional value to some consumers, even if most are indifferent. Literary
critics might be interested in learning more about the man behind
the McBain pseudonym, after all, even if fans are not;1 3 5 similarly, business analysts, regulators, and home brewers might be more interested
131
132
133

See supra note 129.
See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1381, 1414.
See Marilyn Stasio, Evan Hunter, Writer Who as Ed McBain Created Police Procedu-

ral, Dies at 78, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at B10.

134 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12 (1995).
135 Donald W. Foster, Commentary, In the Name of the Author, 33 NEw LITERARY
HIST. 375, 375 (2002). To be sure, different schools of criticism manifest differing
levels of interest, or disinterest, in the details of the author's life and circumstances.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 218-23 (1998) (distinguishing New
Critics from intentionalists). We contend nevertheless that knowledge of these details
is of some use in interpreting a work, even though reasonable minds might accord
them differing weight.

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1563 2006-2007

1564

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

82:4

than the average drinker in learning about the company behind
36
Samuel Adams beer.
A second possible objection to the identity-trademark analogy is
that there is likely to be a much greater difference in quality among
an author's various works than among goods marketed under the
same trademark. Consumers rightly expect every bottle of Coca-Cola
to taste the same; but one might not expect every book by the same
author to be precisely the same in terms of aesthetic merit, accuracy,
or insight. In response to this argument, we would analogize a new
book by an existing, well regarded author to a new product bearing an
existing, well regarded trademark or brand. For example, when CocaCola or Samuel Adams or any other firm markets a new product
under the so-called "family" or "house" mark, 13 7 consumers are likely
to draw some inferences about the quality of the new product based
upon their familiarity with the old. A consumer who has come to trust
Coca-Cola as the licensor of quality beverages is rational when she
expects a new Coca-Cola sponsored product to meet similar quality
standards, despite some possibility that her expectations will be disappointed. Knowing that the product is approved by Coca-Cola enables
the consumer to draw a rational ex ante inference that she would be
unable to draw if the product were generic. Similarly, knowledge of a
well regarded author's identity does not provide a guarantee that a
new work will meet the author's previous quality standards, but it does
increase the Bayesian probability that the work will meet those standards. 315 The benefit to the reader is not absolute, but it is not trivial
either.139
136

Fortunately, the source of a trademarked product is almost never anonymous

in any strong sense. Many companies' trade names are the same as their trademarks
(e.g., Coca-Cola, Microsoft, BMW), in which case the source is not anonymous at all.
Moreover, state legislation often requires "registration of assumed or fictitious names

under which individuals or commercial entities conduct business" so as "to assist
others in identifying the owners of the businesses with whom they deal." RESTATEMENT (THiD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12 cmt. c. Federal and state regulations also
often require identifying information of the manufacturer to appear on or in connection with the products sold. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1500.121 (2006) (requiring that haz-

ardous substances be labeled with the manufacturer's information); 21 C.F.R.
§ 201.1 (a) (2006) (requiring that drug labeling include the manufacturer's information). Trademark registrations are public records, and thus enable interested persons

to discover who owns a registered mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (2000); see also
Levmore, supra note 12, at 2206 n,21 (noting postal regulation).
137
TION

See I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRDEMAmut AND UNFAIR COMPrTI§ 7:5 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing house marks); 3 McCARTHY, supra, § 23:61 (dis-

cussing families of marks).
138 See supra note 129.
139 See Heymann, supra note 2, at 1416 & n.128.
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Two other objections go not so much to the fit between authorial
identity and trademarks as to the rationality of relying upon either as a
proxy for quality. For surely sometimes trademarks do not provide
much useful information about product quality, and the same can be
said about attributed speech as well. Economists recognize that trademarks are relatively more useful for distinguishing among so-called
"experience" goods, that is, goods whose qualities are not easy to evaluate prior to purchase, and relatively less valuable for distinguishing
among "search" goods which consumers can evaluate in advance of
purchase on the basis of observable characteristics.1 40 In our hypothetical above, the taste of a soft drink is clearly an experience good,
but other products (say, fresh fruits and vegetables) are largely search
goods, whose color, shape, and firmness (though often not taste) can
be evaluated in advance. Not surprisingly, trademarks play a less
prominent role in the market for fresh produce than in the markets
for some other goods, but they are not entirely absent either; different
grocery store chains may distinguish themselves on the basis of their
produce, and companies such as Harry & David do market themselves
as purveyors of quality fruit. 1 41 In any event, most goods manifest at
least some experience characteristics, even if they also exhibit some
search qualities as well; clothing, perfume, and automobiles can all be
sampled before purchase, but qualities such as durability often remain
experience characteristics. Speech shares this dual character. To be
sure, some poems, jokes, or works of music (for example) may tend
more toward the "search" end of the spectrum, in that one can quickly
sample and evaluate them without needing to know anything about
their source. But even simple works may be better appreciated if one
knows something about the author, the context in which she wrote,
her likely influences, and so on; all the more so for more complex
works.' 42 And it is often not the case that one can adequately sample
a work prior to purchase or consumption, in which case knowing
something about the author can provide useful information upon
140 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of
Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer
Behavior, 78J. POL. ECON. 311, 312 (1970).
141 Disney also has a trial program in some markets where it is testing a strategy of
branding up-market produce using a Disney character sticker. SeeJenny Wiggins, Disney Develops a Taste for Fresh Fruit, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at 1.
142 Forgeries, for example, once exposed as such, typically lose whatever critical
acclaim they previously enjoyed, even though the physical attributes of the work
remain the same. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 255-56 (2003) (discussing some possible
reasons for this phenomenon); Lastowka, supra note 2, at 1181.
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which to decide whether to purchase or consume. 143 As with other
goods and services, attribution may not always provide much informational value, but this is not to say that it never does or that it typically
does not.
Similarly, one might contest the usefulness of both trademarks
and authorial identity by noting that consumers sometimes overvalue
brand-name goods-and, presumably, brand-name authors, too. But
it hardly follows that the use of brand names is a net cost to society
rather than a net benefit. Granted, consumers occasionally pay more
for a product bearing a famous mark than for a lesser-known product
that functions equally well; consider, for example, consumers who
continue to purchase brand-name drugs even after bioequivalent
generics come on the market.1 44 But even this behavior may be
rational. Some consumers may believe, for example, that the maker
of a brand-name drug will invest more in quality control than the
maker of a generic equivalent. 145 Perhaps it is equally rational to
assume that some "brand-name" expressive works will embody small,
but potentially important, quality advantages over their lesser-known
and superficially fungible competitors. Other times, consumers may
prefer brand-name goods because of the consumptive value of the
brand name itself. People who wear designer jeans and drive Porsches may do so in order to communicate a message about their tastes,
status, and income that they might not be able to communicate as
effectively without these products.1 4 6 Perhaps we also sometimes convey messages about our taste or status based upon our choice of which
authors we credit or admire. It would be at least marginally more difficult to convey such messages if anonymous authorship were the
norm.
That said, it is nevertheless quite plausible that reliance upon
authorial reputation as a proxy for quality or truth or status sometimes
143 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 142, at 117 n.51 (suggesting that books are an
"intermediate case" between search and experience goods, insofar as one can

examine a book before buying it, but the process is time-consuming and "there are
too many books to be able to sample them in this way"); Richard A. Posner, The Future
of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. Rvv. 1131, 1133-34 (1995) (noting that an

author's reputation functions as a proxy for article quality, in much the same way that
trademarks signal product quality).
144 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Are Settlements of PatentDisputes IllegalPer

Se?, 47

ANTITRUST

BULL. 491, 500-01 (2002) (noting that the price of brand-name

drugs sometimes goes up when generics enter the market, due to the brand loyalty
and price insensitivity of some portion of consumers).
145 See LAt)Es & POSNER, supra note 142, at 195.
146 See id. at 208-09; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960,
969-70 (1993).
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more credence or esteem than
results in our according certain works
attention to lesser-known
they deserve-or in paying insufficient
biased
14 7 But the fact that attribution may enable
authors' works.
audithat
or
so,
it always does
decisionmaking does not mean that
For
biases.
against their
ences can never foresee and take precautions
require anonymous submissions;
example, some scholarly journals
and bar examiners, typically
many institutions, including law schools
to use a code number so that
require students taking examinations
the identities of students being
graders will not be able to discern
orchestras typically are congraded; and auditions for symphony
the identity of performers until
ducted so that judges cannot discover
more such measures would be
the audition is completed. Perhaps
a
force audiences to consider
148 but
desirable to combat bias or otherwise
of its inherent characteristics,
work or performance on the basis
social costs of attribution routinely
again, this hardly suggests that the
outweigh the social benefits.
said about anonymous speech
Finally, most of what we have
well, though with a few additional
applies to pseudonymous speech as
speech is that audiences
twists. A problem unique to pseudonymous pseudonym that masks
is merely a
may be unaware that a pen name
may not discount the value of the
thus
and
the author's true identity,
149 Even so, there are two countervailing effects
speech appropriately.
speech more reliable on
that arguably tend to make pseudonymous
speech. One is that pseudonyaverage than completely anonymous
the intermediation of a pubmous speech is often published through
identity. The publisher is, in
lisher who is likely to know the speaker's
credibility. Of course, the same
a sense, vouching for the speaker's
speech; it may be anonymous to
may also be true of some anonymous
150 The other effect is that pseudthe public but not the publisher.
like trademarks, as both Heyonyms actually can function something
147

of an
rely on the presumed characteristics
Indeed, consumers may even
as proxies for quality or

gender, and so forth,
author, such as age, race, social class,

truth.
of artistic
remains anonymous as a matter
148 For example, when an author
audideprive
and
message
might undermine her
choice, revelation of her identity
171
155,
notes
infra
See
intended.
that message as
ences of the opportunity to receive
(discussing
supra note 2, at 1425 & n.153
and accompanying text; see also Heymann,
not knowing the author's iden-

might be better off
instances in which the audience
created by
(discussing the "marketable illusions"
1240
at
2,
tity); Lastowka, supra note
the consequences

note 12, at 2210 (considering
authorial anonymity); Levmore, supra
of deceptive use of authorial anonymity).
text. The same problem would attend
149 See supra note 129 and accompanying
any other type of misattribution.
at 2210.
150 See Levmore, supra note 12,
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15 1 To the extent the speaker has
mann and Lastowka demonstrate.
pseudonym, that investment crereputational capital invested in his
to continue to produce work of1 52preof
ates an incentive for the speaker
the value

incentive to maximize
dictable quality. The author's
for
counteract much of the potential

his authorial trademark may
speech.
abuse that is inherent in pseudonymous

The Private Benefits of Anonymity
that speech consumers find
If attribution generally is something
authors who seek public acclaim
valuable, it is reasonable to ask why
ever choose to publish anonyfor their ideas and expression would
possible reasons above, but in this
mously. We have alluded to some
list of the reasons that authors
subpart provide a more comprehensive
their identities. First, the
may derive private value from withholding
noninstrumental satisfaction from
author may derive some internal,
refer to this as the "Intrinsic Ratiospeaking without attribution; we
author may be concerned about the
nale" for anonymity. Second, the
whose welfare matters to her, may
private costs that she, or others
she presents her artistic vision withincur if she speaks truthfully-if
of anonymity. We refer to this
out flinching-but without the shield
Third, the author may be
as the "Wrongful Retaliation" rationale.
that could flow from speaking falsely
concerned about the private costs
we refer to this as the "Justifiable
without the shield of anonymity;
author may wish to conceal her
Retaliation" rationale. Fourth, the
benefit that would be more
identity in order to derive some collateral
revealed. We refer to this as the
costly to obtain were her identity
the author may be someone who
"Collateral Benefits" rationale. Fifth,
but
the purveyor of low-quality work,
is perceived to be untruthful or
and
or producing high-quality work
who is in fact telling the truth
"Boy
the
as
this
to
We refer
wants her message to be taken seriously.
Who Cried Wolf' rationale.
B.

1. The Intrinsic Rationale
said to promote individual
Anonymous speech is sometimes
53 by enabling individuals to explore
autonomy and self-fulfillment
1197.
at 1380; Lastowka, supra note 2,at
151 See Heymann, supra note 2,
the author's
of
product
a
economically, or as
152 The "value" could be measured
need for
author's
the
of
factor
a
or even as
desire that the speech be persuasive,
affirmation.
OF SPEECH 47-50 (1989)
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM
153 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
amendment valself-determination as the key first
(referring to "self-realization and
6-9 (1970) (arguSYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION
ues"); THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE
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new ideas, new means of expression, 54 and even new identities.155
Thus, one reason for some authors to publish anonymously is that
they derive internal satisfaction from not having their true identity
revealed. An author may even believe that by publishing anonymously
she is making a political or artistic statement. 15 6 This rationale may
underlie the Supreme Court's characterization of Margaret McIntyre's
decision to publish anonymously as an integral part of her freedom to
choose the content of her speech.1 5 7 As such, the interest is akin to
one of the "moral rights" that many nations accord to authors on the
theory that the author's infusion of her unique personality into her
artistic creations entitles her, as a matter of natural law, to a substantial degree of autonomy with respect to how those creations are
presented to the public. 58 In these countries, the author is viewed as
having an inalienable right to attribution, which right embraces a subsidiary right to be properly attributed as the author of that which she
ing that "freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual selffulfillment").
154 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 1ARv.L. Rxv. 1130, 1131 (2000) (noting that the
Internet, with its custom of anonymous and pseudonymous speech, "alters the architecture of both identity presentation ...and social interaction").
155 Tien, supra note 18, at 120 ("[Alnonymity is more than concealing authorial
identity; speech is discursive interaction, and anonymity is useful for constituting individual and group identity in interaction.").
156 For example, a British graffiti artist "Banksy," who has remained pseudonymous "'so I can do my work without being impeded by arrest,"' has gained international recognition. Paul Vallely, Banksy: The Joker, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 23, 2006, at 48,
available at http://news.independent.co.uk/people/profiles/articlel705576.ece; see
also Anne Ferry, Anonymity: The Literary History of a Word, 33 NEw LITERARY HIST. 193,
197 (2002) (noting that in the nineteenth century, "Itihe desire of poets to escape
over-personal interpretations of their poems" spurred them to publish anonymously);
Foster, supra note 135, at 391 (citing the example of Yehiel Feiner, who wrote about
the Holocaust under a pseudonym that translates as "Prisoner," because he
"'rlefuse[d] the right to valorize his individual experience" and "spoke as the invisible man, for one and all" who were killed at Auschwitz); Heymann, supra note 2, at
1401-06 (discussing the use of authornyms for political or social reasons); Lastowka,
supra note 2, at 1222-27 (discussing the use of ghost writers as an example of the
value of authorial "licensing"). Yet another possibility is that the author believes that
anonymity is the more virtuous choice. Religious or ethical traditions may bestow
greater esteem upon anonymous contributions to charities, for example. See
Levmore, supra note 12, at 2196 n.5. A less exalted motivation for anonymous contributions is that the donor may be less likely to be solicited for other worthy causes. Id.;
see also Fisk, supra note 2, at 87-88 (noting that some employers prefer that employees' authorship of software remain anonymous, so as to reduce the risk of other
potential employers luring those employees away).
157 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1994).
158 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C.
L. Rxv. 1, 6-15 (1997).
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has created, a right not to be attributed as the author of that which she
has not created, and a right to publish anonymously or under a pseudonym. 15 9 Although the United States has never fully embraced the
concept of moral rights as it is understood in some (mostly European)
countries, 160 our anonymous speech cases appear to recognize something similar to a moral right to speak anonymously-though, as
noted above, they leave unresolved the question of how much weight
to accord this interest when it comes into conflict with other social
interests.
2.

Wrongful Retaliation

A second reason for speaking anonymously is that the author is
concerned about the potentially negative personal consequences of
159 See id. at 12. Of course, the author may have both intrinsic and instrumental
reasons for wishing to publish anonymously or under an assumed name. Note also
that these fights are not absolute, even in countries with robust moral rights traditions. See Michael B. Gunlicks, A Balance of Interests: The Concordance of Copyright Law
and Moral Rights in the Worldwide Economy, II FomDHas INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
LJ. 601, 624-25 (2001) (citing ADOLF DiETz, DAs DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM
NEUEN FRANZsisCIAEN UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT 121 (1968)) (noting that German law, unlike French law, requires adherence to an express contractual duty for an
author to remain anonymous, with exceptions allowed if the author must prove his
authorship or if the work enjoys unforeseeable success).
160 The U.S. has incorporated some aspects of moral rights protection into its
copyright and unfair competition laws over the past generation, however. See Cotter,
supra note 158, at 15-27. In 1990, for example, Congress amended the Copyright Act
to include a new Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). See Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089, 5128-33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). VARA confers upon the authors of qualifying "works of visual art," see 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definition of "work of visual art"), a right of attribution, see id.
§§ 106A(a)(1)-(2), but it does not explicitly endow authors with a right to publish
anonymously or pseudonymously. See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1037 n.88 (1994). Nevertheless, U.S. copyright law has permitted the registration of anonymous and pseudonymous works for close to 100 years, see Act of Mar. 4,
1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (repealed 1976) (stating
that the copyright term ran for twenty-eight years from the date of publication,
whether the work bore the author's true name or was published anonymously or pseudonymously), though prior to 1909 the copyright status of anonymous works was precarious. See STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE ON COPYRIGHT (May 31-June 2, 1905), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HisTORY
OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT pt. C, at i, 40 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds.,
1976) (containing the statement of Register of Copyrights Thorvald Solberg that, as
of 1905, an author who wished to obtain federal copyright protection and to remain
anonymous had to arrange for another to file the registration as copyright proprietor); 1 PATRY, supra, at 20 (stating that some early state copyright laws declined to
extend protection to anonymous or pseudonymous works).
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speaking truthfully and with attribution. This interest may be implicated in a number of recurring situations. One common example is
the whistleblower who reports on corporate or government wrongdoing despite some risk of incurring retaliation.I 6 1 Similarly, police
informants may prefer to remain anonymous to avoid harms to themselves, their families, or to other informants whose identities might be
compromised. Employees who publish writings that displease their
employers risk being fired,1 62 and people who speak out against corporate policies risk becoming SLAPP targets. 1 63 The nuisance of having to defend oneself from such a suit, even if the suit proves
unsuccessful on the merits, creates an incentive for would-be critics to
voice their opinions anonymously. 1 64 And even when the potential
consequences are of a lesser magnitude, some speakers may simply
feel they can be more candid if allowed to express their opinions
anonymously. In many academic disciplines, for example, peer
reviews of scholarship are anonymous for precisely this reason. A
reviewer forced to disclose her identity may feel inhibited from speaking critically about a person or institution with whom or with which
161

For discussion of the piecemeal nature of whistleblower protection laws, see
& NANCY M. MODESIrr, WHISTLEBLOWING 67-75 (2d ed. 2004).
162 Government employees have First Amendment rights when speaking "as citizens on matters of public concern," but not when speaking "pursuant to their official
duties." See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006). The First Amendment protects both the autonomy interest of the employee when speaking as a citizen,
and the public interest in receiving information. See id. at 1959. ("[W]idespread costs
may arise when dialogue is repressed."); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82
(2004) (per curiam) (stating that the public has an "interest in receiving informed
opinion" (emphasis added)).
163 See Pring, supra note 108, at 6-9 (summarizing a U.S. study on the existence,
causes, and effects of SLAPPs). While many state legislatures have enacted "antiSLAPP" legislation in the past fifteen years, Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases:
Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 603, 609-11 (2005), companies are now merely shifting their strategies,
and in some cases are using anti-SLAPP legislation itself as a sword. See id. at 607.
164 Alternatively, the speaker may fear retaliation that is lawful but questionable
for policy reasons. To cite one example, W. Mark Felt might have been subject to
prosecution had his role as "Deep Throat" been revealed at the time of the Watergate
scandal. See 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2000) (criminalizing the theft, conveyance or disposal
of public records or things of value). If Felt had exposed such information today, he
could also be prosecuted under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), or found in
contempt of court under the federal grand jury secrecy rule, FED. R. CruM. P. 6(e). See
Timothy Noah, Were Felt's Leaks Illegal?, SLA-IrF, June 1, 2005, http://www.slate.com/
id/2120069/index.htrnl. Ironically, President Nixon also took advantage of anonymity by planting pseudonymous newspaper articles praising his administration. See Foster, supra note 135, at 381; Heymann, supra note 2, at 1408 n.106.
DANIEL P. WESTMAN
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Other times, speakers
may simply wish not to be harassed with follow-up questions or
65

solicitations. 1 6 6

Alternatively, authors may wish to avoid the shame, humiliation,
or social ostracism that might result from disclosure of their identities.
To vindicate this interest, courts in some rare instances permit litigants-the putative authors, or at least authorizers,of the papers filed
on their behalf-to proceed without revealing their identities, as in
Roe v. Wade.167 More generally, absent anonymity, an author may feel
constrained by her class,' 68 her gender,16 9 or her professional status,
165 Such records are often confidential, but they are potentially discoverable in
litigation. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 192 (1990).
166 See Levmore, supra note 12, at 2193.
167 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973) (noting without comment that the petitioner's
name was a pseudonym). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires every pleading to include the caption of the case, including the parties' names, and Rule 17(a)
requires that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. See
FED. R. Cry. P. 10(a), 17(a). In cases implicating "significant privacy interests," however-principally challenges to laws regulating such matters as sexual behavior, birth
control, and abortion-courts sometimes permit parties to litigate under pseudonyms, though even in this context often on the condition that the party's real name
be disclosed to the court and to the defense. W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172
(10th Cir. 2001) (citing Nat'l Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886 F.2d 1240, 1245
(10th Cir. 1989)); see also Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678,
684-87 (lth
Cir. 2001) (recognizing the right of a plaintiff in an abortion case to
proceed anonymously, provided that her name be disclosed to defendants for discovery purposes). The practice of not publishing the names of alleged rape victims or
underage criminal defendants, either in news accounts or in reported cases, is based
upon a similar rationale, although in these instances both parties would be aware of
the identities of the alleged victim and of the defendant, and their names would usually be used in open court. And sometimes fear of outright retaliation, notjust ostracism, appears to predominate. See Doe v. Barrow County, 219 F.R.D. 189, 192-94
(N.D. Ga. 2003) (permitting anonymous challenge to Ten Commandments display).
168 See Ferry, supra note 156, at 195 (noting that in the seventeenth century "it was
considered altogether improper for gentlemen and persons of rank to appear in print
as poets, so that (those] who wanted to display their wit as a way of advancing themselves in courtly circles were driven to publish verse unsigned but under fancy disguises that could be seen through"); Foster, supra note 135, at 379 (observing that in
early modem England, "[p]ersons of rank . . . were more heavily invested in their
personal name than in their literary product").
169 "The motivations for publishing anonymously.., have included an aristocratic
or a gendered reticence, religious self-effacement, anxiety over public exposure, fear
of prosecution, hope of an unprejudiced reception, and the desire to deceive." Robert J. Griffin, Anonymity and Authorship, 30 NEW LITERARY HIsT. 877, 885 (1999).
Another example that might fall within this category is that of a speaker who publishes anonymously or under a pseudonym to avoid the audience's perceived irrational bias. As Levmore and Heymann both note, for example, women authors often
resorted to male-sounding pseudonyms (e.g., George Sand) so that their works would
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or by the ideas or opinions of her employer. An author of erotic stories, for example, may prefer to keep her identity as a high school
physics teacher secret-perhaps because of potential retaliation from
her employer, but also because of the potential for embarrassment
170
and breakdown of classroom discipline that may otherwise result.
Nor is the need for anonymity necessarily limited to narrow personal
interests; one might be motivated to protect the group or nation to
which one belongs instead. For example, when George Kennan published his famous ForeignAffairs article (under the pseudonym "X") in
1947, heralding what came to be known as the U.S. containment policy against the Soviet Union, he requested anonymity due to his
71
employment at the time with the U.S. State Department.1
In all of the preceding examples, anonymity not only reduces the
speaker's private costs of speaking but also may be seen to advance
two important social goals as well. First, anonymity encourages contributions to the marketplace of ideas by eliminating barriers both to
speaking (such as age, social status, or ethnicity) and to listening
(such as fear of social censure or geographical isolation). 172 Protecting anonymity helps those with inside information sound the alarm
against threats to public welfare, and it helps citizens to check abuses
by powerful institutions, corporations, and actors. 173 Second, anonybe taken seriously within a male-oriented culture. See Heymann, supra note 2,at
1398-1400; Levmore, supra note 12, at 2208-09, 2213-14.
170 See also Heymann, supra note 2, at 1404-05 (providing an example of one professor who admittedly wrote mystery novels under an authornym for fear of being
rejected for tenure).
171 See, e.g., WALTER ISAACSON & EvAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN 383-85 (1986).
172 It does this in part by encouraging speakers to contribute to public discourse
without fear. Kang observes that "individuals are less fearful in cyberspace" because
their "physical body is never at risk." See Kang, supra note 154, at 1161. Anonymous
speech also encourages audiences to listen without allowing the identity of the
speaker to prejudice their interpretation of his message. See Lidsky, supra note 10, at
896 (arguing that the widespread use of anonymity and pseudonymity on the Internet
"disguises status indicators such as race, class, gender, ethnicity, and age, which allow
elite speakers to dominate real-world discourse"); Post, supra note 42, at 640 ("In
most circumstances we attend as carefully to the social status of a speaker, and to the
social context of her words, as we do to the bare content of her communication.").
Lee Bollinger offers another argument that, if true, applies equally well to anonymous
speech; he contends that one of the functions of the First Amendment is to make us
more tolerant of others by bringing us into contact with diverse ideas and viewpoints.
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 50 (1986).
173 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs.J. 521, 527. Anonymity also enables speakers to initiate social movements
to challenge repressive regimes. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent
Social Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 119,
163-70 (2001).
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mous speech promotes democratic self-governance, which Alexander
Meiklejohn and others have argued is the ultimate aim of the First
Amendment 174 The inclusion of voices in public debate that might
not otherwise be heard, particularly the voices of those with less power
and influence, makes public discourse and ultimately our system of
government more democratic. By increasing the likelihood that
unconventional perspectives will be brought to bear on important
social problems, anonymity may help generate creative solutions. And
even if it does not, citizens who participate in public discourse are
more likely to seek out information about important policy issues and
thus to become more capable of exercising democratic selfgovernance.
3. Justifiable Retaliation
A darker side of anonymity is revealed, however, when we consider various other reasons why authors may wish to speak without
attribution. One prominent reason is that the speaker wants to conceal his identity because he fears the negative consequences of having
spoken falsely. The disgruntled employee may wish to spread lies
about his employer with impunity; the anonymous reviewer may wish
to settle a personal score; a confidential informant or spy may wish to
sow the seeds of discontent or control public opinion. More generally, the pathological liar (Epimenides's Cretan in our earlier example) 175 is likely to be better off speaking anonymously than with
attribution; unaware of the liar's true identity, people may accord his
anonymous speech more credit than, on balance, it is due.1 76 Thus
Schopenhauer may have been exaggerating when he called anony174

See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("[T]here is practically universal

agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free

discussion of governmental affairs."); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 37-41 (1948) (arguing that speech not relevant to
self-government is protected by the Due Process Clause, but not by the First Amendment); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv.
245, 253-56; Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 255, 313-14 (1992)
(noting the First Amendment reflects a "structural commitment to deliberative
democracy").
175 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
176 In addition, it may be more difficult to track down and punish a truly anonymous speaker. Whether a rule forbidding anonymity would give rise to substantial
social benefits for this reason alone, all other things being equal, is nevertheless difficult to say. People who wished to speak falsely might simply flout a rule requiring
them to disclose their true identities. Compare McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 352-53 (1995) (questioning the difficulty of enforcing bans on disseminating false documents against anonymous authors as opposed to wrongdoers using
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mous speech "the refuge for all literary and journalistic rascality," but
he cogently stated the case for author attribution as a curb to abuse:
[W]hen a man publicly proclaims through the far-sounding trumpet of the newspaper, he should be answerable for it, at any rate
with his honor, if he has any; and if he has none, let his name neutralize the effect of his words. And since even the most insignificant
person is known in his own circle, the result of such a measure
would be to put an end to two-thirds of the newspaper
lies, and to
177
restrain the audacity of many a poisonous tongue.
Nearly two hundred years after Schopenhauer, the Internet has
come to exacerbate this dark side of anonymity due to its "disinhibiting effect" on many speakers. Studies show that even when an
Internet user is not anonymous and knows the recipient of his e-mail
message, the speaker is more likely to be disinhibited when engaged
in "computer mediated communication" than in other types of communications.1 78 The technology separates the speaker from the
immediate consequences of her speech, perhaps (falsely) lulling her
to believe that there will be no consequences. Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.
4. Collateral Benefits
A fourth possibility, related to the preceding one, is that the
speaker wishes to conceal his identity in order to enhance the
probability of obtaining some collateral benefit to which he is not
79
entitled, or which could otherwise be obtained only at higher cost.'

false names), with id. at 382 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that a signing requirement would significantly deter authors from lying).

177
178

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE ART OF LITERATURE

77 (1960).

See Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET 75, 79-81 (Jayne Gachenback ed., 2d ed. 2007); Danah Boyd, Faceted Id/
Entity: Managing Representation in a Digital World 30 (Aug. 9, 2002) (unpublished
M.S. thesis, Brown University), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/Thesis.Facetedldentity.pdf ("[I1n anonymous situations, people's lack of fear of retribution or
sense of other people undermines the effectiveness of social regulation."); M.E.
Kabay, Anonymity and Pseudonymity in Cyberspace 10 (Mar. 1998) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www2.norwich.edu/mkabay/overviews/anonpseudo.
pdf (arguing that anonymity lowers peoples "normal inhibitions" because "the deindividuation of anonymous people lowers their self-reflective propensities").
179 To be sure, the First Amendment does not protect fraud: for example, using
fake identification to obtain liquor or cigarettes, to register to vote, or to obtain a
driver's license or passport. Cf Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177,
187-88 (2004) (upholding requirement that persons detained on "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity identify themselves to police). Clearly, the state may require
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a book reviewer who wishes to
To cite one example, one can imagine
would be more likely to conclude
conceal his identity because people
identity were known. History is
that the review is biased if the author's
writers who published favorable
indeed replete with examples of
accomplishments, either anonyreviews of their own work or other
18 1 Alternatively, a speaker may wish
mouslyi8 0 or under pseudonyms.
source for political advertiseto conceal his identity as the funding
post-election, that the prevailing
ments in order to deflect suspicion,
the public fisc. Or consider the
candidate is repaying the funder from
in Part I.C. When I transmit
copyright infringement cases discussed
person, I may well be expressing
copyrighted materials to another
"I like this music," or "I think you
something true and valuable (e.g.,
reasons I choose to transmit
will enjoy this song"). But the main
and the recipient from copyright
anonymously may be to shield myself
is without consent of the copyright
liability, assuming the transmission
owner, and to induce future exchanges.
above could simply be
Arguably all of the phenomena described
heading 'Justifiable Retaliation."
listed as further examples under the
that, in these instances,
We separate them out only to make the point
believe that his work
may
He
truth:
the speaker may well be telling the
deserves to win, or that the fileis admirable, or that his political party
circum18 2
to.
shared music is worth listening

(Depending on the

either, other than in the soft sense
stances, he may not face retaliation
the copyright and breach-of-confiof suspicion or disbelief; though in
be much more serious.) The pubdentiality cases the penalties could
in knowing the identity of the
lic nevertheless also has some interest
without
a wide range of government benefits,
disclosure of identity in order to obtain
upon
touch
however,
above,
speech. Our examples
incurring liability for compelling
public
as
such
benefits
collateral
to obtain
the publication of expressive speech
favors.
political
or
acclaim
(1984)
THE MAXING OF THE POET 271-73
180 See, e.g., PAUL ZWEIG, WALT WHiTMAN:
self-reviews).
(discussing Walt Whitman's anonymous
ed. 2006)
FREAKONOMICS 121-22 (rev.
DUBNER,
181 STEVEN D. LEVTT & STEPHENJ.
pseudonym
the
under
statements about himself
(discussing an author's favorable
for similar

work
an anonymous review of another's
"Mary Rosh"). One might publish
(either for or against the author).

of bias
reasons, that is, to minimize the suspicion
also might be compared to publishing
reviews
An author's publication of anonymous
that stands to
being funded by a person or entity
a study without revealing that it is
benefit from a particular conclusion.
fiduciary who
that of a doctor, lawyer, or other
182 Another example might be
patient or cliconfidential, information about a
anonymously discloses truthful, but
some collateral benefit or to settle a score,
ent. Whether the motivation was to attain
benefits
clearly at odds with the perceived social
the author's interest in anonymity is
of enforcing legal duties of confidentiality.
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source, so as to judge for itself the credibility of the review, or the
potential for political corruption or other rent-seeking behavior; or,
assuming that the application of copyright liability to file-sharing is on
balance socially desirable, to discourage the unauthorized transmission of copyrighted works.
5.

The Boy Who Cried Wolf

A fifth possibility is that the speaker prefers anonymity because
she perceives that the public will accord her speech less value-to the
public's own detriment, as well as to the speaker's-if it realizes her
identity. Everyone but the wolf, after all, would have been better off
had the boy in Aesop's fable been credited on the one occasion on
which he spoke the truth about the lupine menace. As noted above,
when the public perceives the probability of a given speaker speaking
the truth as being below the average for speakers generally, the
speaker is likely better off speaking anonymously than he would be if
he revealed his true identity. In this instance, however, withholding
the speaker's identity also may protect the public against (rationally)
underestimating the truth-value of the statement.
III.

TOWARD

A NORMATIVE STANDARD

The analysis presented above suggests, among other things, that
attribution often provides valuable information for speech consumers,
and accordingly that audiences will tend to discount speech from an
undisclosed source. Some authors nevertheless prefer to publish
anonymously, either because of the intrinsic satisfaction anonymity
gives them, or because they believe that anonymity shields them from
adverse consequences that they would suffer if their identities were
known. Yet our positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any
clear normative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal
response to anonymous speech. In crafting a normative analysis,
therefore, we draw upon traditional First Amendment principles to
provide some weight to the various interests that our normative analysis has identified as relevant. We argue below that existing First
Amendment law generally assumes that more speech is better than
less, even if a necessary byproduct of more speech is the production of
more harmful speech, and that audiences for core First Amendment
speech are largely rational and capable of self-governance. Whether
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true, 18 3 they are deeply
or not these assumptions are demonstrably
and rules that comport with
enmeshed in our constitutional system,
constitutional scrutiny. Taking
them are more likely to withstand
point, we can begin to devise stanthese assumptions as our starting
speech, based upon the predards for the regulation of anonymous
of compulsory disclosure are
mise that the potential chilling effects
weight, and that audience self-help
real and must be given substantial
substitute for compulsory disis, in general, an adequate if imperfect
and apply it to some current matters
closure. We develop this analysis
of controversy in the following Part.
of Anonymous Speech
Assessing the Social Costs and Benefits
the social costs and benefits
One way of further analyzing
the consequences of a hypothetical
described in Part I is to consider
their identities under all cirrule that required speakers to disclose
of a rule forbidding anonymity
cumstances. An obvious consequence
crave anonymity for intrinsic reasons
would be that some authors who
On the other hand, authors who
might prefer not to publish at all.
wrongful retaliation could be
speak anonymously only to avoid
in
if retaliation could be deterred
induced to speak with attribution
simultanethat
of speakers, a system
other ways. Indeed, for this class
identity and effectively preously compelled disclosure of authorial
to one that merely protected
vented retaliation would be preferable
consumers would stand to benefit
anonymity, because (1) speech
and (2) the speaker would stand
from knowing the speaker's identity,
all other things being equal.
a better chance of being taken seriously,
(let alone mere social ostraReality suggests, however, that retaliation
a
100% effectiveness, and thus that
cism) can never be prevented with
some
discourage
certainly would
rule forbidding anonymity almost
forward. Stronger penalties
apprehensive speakers from coming
ameliorate some of the negative
against retaliation nevertheless could
rule (though such penalties could
consequences of a nonanonymity
such as an increase in the
give rise to other negative consequences
determinations that wrongful
cost of false positives, i.e., erroneous
a rule forbidding anonymity
retaliation has occurred). In addition,
too little weight to truthful warnings
might cause the public to accord
as the Boy Who Cried Wolf-though
emanating from speakers such
this problem in advance would
potential wolf-criers who recognize
not to develop a reputation as
have a marginally greater incentive
A.

Bambauer,
commonplace settings. See Derek E.
183 They may well be false in some
Marketplace of
the
of
Fallacy
the
and
Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communications,
(2006).
Ideas, 77 U. CoLo. L. Ruv. 649, 704-05
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wolf-criers in the first place. A rule requiring them to disclose their
identifies therefore could conceivably have a net positive effect on the
dissemination of truthful information, at least in the long run.1 8 4
On the other side of the ledger, a rule that required speakers to
disclose their identities would deter some members of the third class
of anonymous speakers-those who fear justifiable retaliation-from
coming forward. But this result might appear to be a positive social
good, to the extent this class of speakers gives rise to greater social
losses than private benefits. 18 5 Moreover, a rule protecting this class
against retaliation would make no sense, even if it were feasible, precisely because such a rule would immunize the class from liability for
defamation, product disparagement, and other conduct that the legal
system (rightly, in our view) condemns. A disclosure rule also would
require speakers in the fourth class, those seeking collateral benefits,
to reveal their identities-and this too would appear to be a social
good, if, for example, it would enable speech consumers to draw
appropriate inferences about the credibility of the speech at issue.1 8 6
What the preceding analysis suggests, unfortunately, is that any
attempt to tally up the social costs and benefits of anonymous speech
is destined to be indeterminate; or, to put it another way, that our
positive analysis standing alone leads to few if any clear normative conclusions. On the one hand, it is conceivable (though, we think,
unlikely) that a rule forbidding anonymity altogether would maximize
social welfare, even when the potential chilling effect with respect to
speakers falling into categories one and two-those who crave anonymity for intrinsic reasons, and those who fear wrongful retaliationis taken into account. Surely some of these speakers would continue
to speak out, even at some risk or discomfort to themselves; those risks
could be reduced somewhat by increasing the penalties for retaliation,
and whatever social losses that would nevertheless ensue would have
184 An analogy can be drawn to the firm that wants consumers to recognize its
trademark as symbolizing a consistent level of quality. See supra note 125.
185 But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) ("Even a false
statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it
brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error."' (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, ON LBERTY 15 (1947))).
186 This is not to say that all cases arguably falling into this or other categories
would be easy cases. Speakers may have mixed motives for retaining anonymity-or it
may be difficult to discern what the speaker's motive is at all. Political speech in
particular may be difficult to disentangle. On the one hand, speakers may rightly fear
retaliation for speaking their minds in a public forum. On the other, knowing who
has funded a political advertisement provides some insight into who is likely to be
showered with benefits flowing from the public fisc, if the candidate whose position
aligns with the advertisement comes to power.
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to be balanced against the gains flowing from a reduction in the quantity of harmful speech. 8 7 For surely more harmful speech and other
rent-seeking behavior would either be deterred or more easily
detected if anonymity were forbidden; perhaps, then, the benefits of a
nonanonymity rule would outweigh the costs, as measured by some
felicific calculus. On the other hand, a regime that forbade anonymity altogether might seem creepy, if not outright totalitarian. And it
may well be the case-in fact, we suspect that it probably is the casethat a reasonable social welfare calculus cuts in favor of some sort of
proanonymity norm, if we assume that (1) substantial numbers of
speakers falling into categories one and two would be deterred from
coming forward under a mandatory disclosure rule, and (2) audiences
can protect themselves from many' 88 of the potential harms of anonymous speech by resort to the self-help option, i.e., by not giving anonymous speech as much credit as attributed speech. 18 9 Exactly how
strong the proanonymity norm must be, however, assuming that some
version of a proanonymity norm is welfare-enhancing at all, is hardly

187 Indeed, whistleblowers, informants, and other would-be truth-tellers often do
have to reveal their identities eventually, for example, if they are called to testify in
court. Due process is surely sufficiently weighty to overcome the speaker's interest in
anonymity-which simply shows that the strong version of the right to speak anonymously, which some might read into McIntyre, cannot be the last word. Moreover, as
suggested in the text above, government sometimes does try to protect nonanonymous whistleblowers from retaliation-for example, through anti-SLAPP legislation, see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 25.16 (West Supp. 2007); witness protection
programs, see Witness Security Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-3528 (2000);
and rules protecting the identity of confidential tipsters under some circumstances,
see, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938) (stating that, in a criminal
case, disclosure of an informer's identity is forbidden "unless essential to the
defense"). Where such protections are in place, the social interest in permitting anonymity is reduced as well. To the extent audiences may benefit from artistically-motivated anonymity, however, see supra notes 156, 172, that benefit would be lost under a
nonanonymity regime.
188 Concededly, not all audience members will respond reasonably to speech by
an unknown author, as the prevalence of sparn e-mails suggests. After all, if no one
responded to the often-pseudonymous offers of sexual enhancement or stock market
tips, the sparn would stop coming.
189 Here, the rationale in favor of anonymity is similar to that which underlies
copyright and some other forms of intellectual property protection: that, while copyright may give rise to a variety of social costs, on balance it creates a surplus of social
benefits by encouraging the production and publication of works of authorship that
otherwise would not be produced or published. The rationale is also similar to that
underlying various evidendary privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege.
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the sort of thing that can be determined with scientific precision.
Strictly speaking, the analysis remains indeterminate.1 9 0
We nevertheless contend that the analysis is useful in several
respects. First, it shows that implicit tradeoffs will occur, whether we
desire them or not, and whatever the rule society adopts happens to
be. A rule that provides strong protection to anonymous speech will
result in more harmful speech, whereas a rule that provides weak protection threatens to chill a good deal of core speech. We may not
know which effect predominates, but it is useful to recognize that
some socially desirable consequences will be forgone, no matter which
rule prevails. The analysis also encourages us to consider other ways
(such as increased reliance upon self-help or the adoption of measures to prevent retaliation) of reducing the anticipated but inevitable
negative consequences that are likely to flow from whatever rule is
adopted. Second, the analysis suggests that, to the extent that social
welfare considerations play at least some role in the debate, the premises implicit in existing law can be used to craft presumptions about
whether the benefits or harms of anonymous speech are likely to
predominate under various possible standards. We elaborate upon
this point in the following subpart.
B.

First Amendment Presumptions

Traditional First Amendment theory helps to fill the gaps left by
the positive analysis by providing two important premises: first, that
audiences are capable of rationally assessing the truth, quality, and
other characteristics of core speech, and second, that more speech is
generally preferable to less. Both premises are open to debate. 19 1 But
both have a long and distinguished pedigree and are unlikely to be
displaced from the pantheon of general First Amendment principles
190 Indeed, the problems with a purely utilitarian analysis of anonymous speech go
beyond mere indeterminacy. Whether the costs and benefits of anonymous speech
are even commensurable with respect to one another is debatable: As we suggested
above, for example, if the autonomy interests in support of a right to speak anonymously are worthy of respect, how exactly does one determine the optimal tradeoff in
return for a reduction in harmful speech? More importantly, and as others before us
have noted, the social welfare approach appears inconsistent with a good deal of
existing First Amendment jurisprudence (even if, as we would argue, it captures some
aspects of thatjurisprudence). Much speech may be of little value, or even positively
harmful, but few accounts of the First Amendment make these observations paramount, or even relevant under all circumstances. See, e.g.,
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom
of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality,112 YAE L.J. 1, 20-24 (2002).
191 See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency,91 IowA L. REv. 885, 928 (2006)
(citing empirical studies "demonstrat[ing) citizens' lack of political knowledge," but
observing that public choice theory explains why "the public's ignorance is rational").
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anytime soon. Thus, anonymity norms that take these principles as
starting points will fit comfortably within the existing First Amendment framework, and reliance on these principles will avoid the
impasse that otherwise arises due to the unquantifiable nature of the
costs and benefits of anonymous speech.
1. Audiences Are Rational
A critical factor in weighing the value of the right to speak anonymously against other important rights and interests is how audiences
respond to anonymous speech. Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence does not address the issue directly, despite the fact that its
dominant metaphor, the "marketplace of ideas," entails an implicit
theory of audience response.1 92 Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
together with Louis Brandeis articulated the philosophical foundation
of modern First Amendment theory,1 93 introduced the marketplace of
ideas metaphor into First Amendment jurisprudence. Holmes
asserted in Abrams v. United States' 94 that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."' 95 Holmes's assertion is a tenet of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence, but it only has credence if the "consumers" in the marketplace of ideas are shrewd evaluators of information circulating in
that market. Consumers in a market pick and choose what is valuable,
and their aggregate decisions drive purveyors of worthless goods (or
information) out of the market. Yet marketplace theory only works if
consumers are capable of thinking critically and exercising autonomy
to discern what is valuable and what is not. 96 Extending the analogy,
if truth (whether Truth with a capital "T" or some more contingent
notion of truth) is to emerge from the marketplace of ideas, the consumers of ideas must be capable of exercising their critical faculties to
separate the wheat from the chaff, the valuable (by each consumer's
own lights) from the valueless.
Holmes recognized that the operation of the marketplace of
ideas relies on the rationalism of American citizens. Abrams involved
the prosecution of five Russian socialist immigrants for distributing
192

See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,J., dissenting).

193
194

See MARc A. FRANKLIN
250 U.S. 616.

ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW

7-12 (7th ed. 2005).

195 Id. at 630 (HolmesJ, dissenting).
196 See M. Neil Browne et al., The Shared Assumptions of the Jury System and the Market
System, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 436 (2006) ("The key to market optimality is the
presumed existence of the calculating, well-informed, intensely rational consumer in
a context where power relationships permit the rationality to function freely.").
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pamphlets opposing U.S. involvement in World War 1.197 Although
Holmes had nothing but contempt for the "creed" espoused by the
defendants, "these poor and puny anonymities," 98 he believed that
the government had failed to establish that their speech hindered the
U.S. war effort. 19 9 Employing what would come to be known as the
clear and present danger test,200 Holmes concluded that the defendants' speech did not present an imminent threat of "immediate" harm
precisely because a rational audience would discount what the defendants had written; "[o]nly the emergency that makes it immediately
dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants
making any exception to the [First Amendment]."201 A rational and
skeptical audience, if given time for deliberation, can discuss and ultimately see through "evil counsels," thereby eliminating their dangers
202
without resort to government regulation.
Justice Brandeis further articulated this rationalist conception of
public discourse. 20 3 Brandeis firmly believed that the forces of "reason as applied through public discussion" would ameliorate potentially dangerous speech. 20 4 According to Brandeis, "[o]nly an
emergency can justify repression" 20 5 of speech, even speech the State
believes to be "false and fraught with evil consequence." 20 6 In ordi197 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616-17 (majority opinion).
198 Id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 628-29.
200 Justice Brandeis further refined the test in Whitney v. California:
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by processes
of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Vincent Blasi has called Brandeis's opinion in Whitney "arguably the most important essay ever written . . . on the
meaning of the first amendment." Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv.
653, 668 (1988).
201 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630-31 (Holmes, ., dissenting).
202 As scholar G. Edward White has noted, Holmes, despite his famous skepticism
about human nature, believed that "humans are inherently rational beings." G.
Edward White, The Canonizationof Holmes and Brandeis:Epistemology andJudicialReputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 579 n.11 (1995); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Brandenburg and the United States' War on Incitement Abroad: Defending a Double Standard, 37
WAKE FolsrsT L. REv. 1009, 1017-27 (2002) (discussing the intellectual contributions
of Holmes and Brandeis to modern First Amendment theory).
203 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
204 Id. at 375-76.
205 Id. at 377.
206 Id. at 374.

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1583 2006-2007

1584

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82: 4

nary circumstances, the State must rely on its citizens to "expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies [of dangerous speech],
to avert the evil by the processes of education." 20 7 Brandeis, like
Holmes, preferred the correction of evil speech via public discussion
rather than state coercion, viewing state coercion not only as unnecessary, but also as a threat to citizen autonomy, democratic participa20 8
tion, and the search for truth.
This faith in rationalism permeates First Amendment jurisprudence. 20 9 To list just a few examples, the Supreme Court adapted the
test for punishing speech that incites violence directly from Holmes's
clear and present danger test, and the incitement test assumes that
audiences can avoid the dangers of inciting speech by employing their
common sense.2 10 The Supreme Court made this point abundantly
clear in the incitement case Dennis v. United States2 11: "[T]he basis of
the First Amendment is the hypothesis that speech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda, free debate of ideas will result in
the wisest governmental policies." 2 1 2

This same assumption is the

basis of the Court's prohibition of fighting words, which include only
those expressions that spur the listener to violence before he has time
2 13
for rational thought.
Defamation law also strongly reflects the Supreme Court's faith in
rationalism. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,214 the landmark case
207 Id. at 377.
208 See Lidsky, supra note 202, at 1023-24.
209 This Article makes no claim about original intent, but Thomas Jefferson's First
Inaugural Address displays a rationalist bent: "If there be any among us who would
wish to dissolve this Union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1801), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc.
No. 101-10, at 13, 15; see also Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4,
1822), inTHE COMPLETE MADISON 337, 337 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953) ("[A] people
who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives."); Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf Is Not Always in for a Cow: An
Analysis of the ConstitutionalRight of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 581 n.224 (2002) (noting that Founding-era leaders such
as Benjamin Franklin believed that freedom of expression was properly limited by the
rights of other individuals).
210 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). The incitement test has
been adapted to the tort context as well. For thoughtful discussion, see David A.
Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAE FOREST L. REv. 957 (2002).
211 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
212 Id. at 503.
213 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
214 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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"constitutionalizing" defamation law, the Court explicitly quoted Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v. California for the
proposition:
"'Those who won our independence believed... that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.... Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
2 15
law-the argument of force in its worst form.'

Yet the Sullivan Court did not paint an idealized portrait of public discussion. The Court recognized that "debate on public issues"
will "include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials," as well as "half-truths,"
"misinformation," "exaggeration," "vilification," and "false statement[s] ."216 The Court nonetheless held that the State may only pun-

ish defamatory falsehoods about public officials when the speaker
knows or recklessly disregards the falsity of his words. Thus, the State
may punish lies about public officials, but not merely negligent falsehoods. The Sullivan Court based its holding in part on the inevitability of "erroneous statement.., in free debate" and the chilling effect
that would result were such statements to form the basis for large tort
verdicts. 2 1 7 However, Sullivan also rests on the premise that public
officials will not suffer unduly as a result of the inevitable false statement. For this premise to be realized, however, the public must be
capable of sorting through the "half-truths" and "misinformation" to
glean the foundations of "enlightened opinion." As the Court wrote,
a paramount First Amendment value is ensuring that public discourse
is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 21 8 but this kind of discourse
can only benefit citizens who are capable of exercising their critical
faculties to ferret out valuable information.
This same reliance on the audience to apply its critical faculties
lies at the heart of the public figure/private figure distinction in defamation. 2 19 This distinction rests largely on the fact that public figures,
as speakers, have more access than other speakers to the marketplace
of ideas, and can protect themselves from the harm of defamation by
215 Id. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).

216

Id. at 270-73.

217 Id. at 271-72.
218 Id. at 270.
219 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (noting that public
figures have access to the media to rebut defamatory falsehoods, and using this to
justify, in part, forcing them to prove actual malice before recovering for
defamation).
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employing "self-help-using available opportunities to contradict the
lie or correct the error." 22 0 Public figures, in other words, have more
ability than other speakers to win over the public in the "competition
of ...ideas." 22 1 If the audience is allowed to hear both sides, it can
rationally determine the truth of the matter for itself. Thus, public
figures must show a high standard of fault in order to recover for defamation.

222

Private figures, unable to use self-help as effectively to rem-

edy defamation, receive more legal solicitude and are able to recover
damages under much less stringent standards. The constitutional lesson to be drawn seems to be that the First Amendment prefers selfhelp remedies to state coercion. Put another way, the constitutional
preference is for requiring victims of potentially harmful speech to
mitigate that harm by engaging the critical faculties of the audience;
the audience can then discern the truth from the competing claims,
at least in the realm of speech that lies at the core of the First
Amendment.
2.

More IsBetter

The presumption that audiences will respond rationally to speech
is integrally related to a second fundamental presumption in First
Amendment jurisprudence, namely, that truth is best gathered "'out
of a multitude of tongues."' 2 23 This proposition, too, is debatable.
Speech from a multitude of tongues may be diverse, but it also may be
unintelligible; and some observers question whether true diversity can
be accomplished without paternalistic governmental intervention. 22 4
Whatever the merits of these arguments, the laissez-faire approach to
the marketplace of ideas remains the dominant paradigm for regulat220 Id.
221 Id. at 340.
222 Id.
223 Keyishian v. Rd.of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting Unites States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)). Presumably, diversity in the marketplace of ideas maximizes the choices available to consumers. See Browne et al., supra note 196, at 433 (pointing out that this same
assumption-of "social benefit emerging from a vigorous clash of interests"-underlies the jury system).
224 See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH XVii-XX,
18-19 (1993). Diversity is thwarted when powerful media corporations "set the
parameters of public debate." FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 11. Moreover,
"[mlany citizens are barred from meaningful participation in the marketplace of
ideas by poverty or inadequate education, and class, race, or gender may impair the
ability of some speakers to make their voices heard." Id.
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ing the print media, including the Internet. 22 5- The laissez-faire
approach reflects both the strength of our national commitment to
democratic self-governance as well as our distrust of governmental
intervention.2 2 6 Respect for the autonomy of citizens demands that
they be allowed to consider all available information in deciding what
course to follow. And they must be free to make these choices without
governmental intervention, for such intervention "would necessarily
circumscribe the potential for collective self-determination." 22 7 Even
if a benign moderator might improve the quality of public discourse,
American constitutional theory normally bars the state from playing
that role (and rightly so). If history proves anything, it proves that
distrust of governmental intervention in the marketplace of ideas is
warranted, for governmental attempts to "prescribe what shall be
orthodox" 2 28 have resulted frequently in suppression of truth and
22 9
enshrinement of error.
In recognition of this fact, First Amendment jurisprudence has
committed to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public discourse,
even at the expense of tolerating some degree of false and abusive
speech. Early on, James Madison recognized that "[s]ome degree of
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no
instance is this more true than in that of the press." 2 30 Explicitly
225 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (applying this approach to regulation
of Internet speech). Broadcasting is subject to far more government controls due to
spectrum scarcity. See generally Mehmet Konar-Steenberg, The Needle and the Damage
Done: The Pervasive Presence of Obsolete Mass Media Audience Models in First Amendment
Doctrine,8 VAND.J. Errr. & TECH. L. 45, 46 (2005) (decrying paternalistic regulation of
broadcast media as inconsistent with empirical research on audience behavior); RonaldJ. Krotoszynski,Jr. & A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Enhancingthe Spectrum: Media Power,
Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 813, 873 ("[1]f the ownership of local media outlets is centralized among a few owners, the dangers of selfserving and, perhaps, antidemocratic, behavior loom much larger.").
226 As Alexander Meiklejohn eloquently wrote, "[w] hen men govern themselves, it
is they-and no one else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness
and danger. And that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise
ones

. . . ."

MEIKLEJOH-N,

supra note 174, at 26.

227 Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1118 (1993); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as
a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 40 (1975) (observing
that the "state lacks 'moderators' who can be trusted to know when 'everything worth
saying' has been said").
228 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
229 For eloquent expression of this idea, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH
81-86 (1982).
230 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quoting 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

571 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876)).
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adopting Madison's philosophy, the Supreme Court in New York Times
refused to punish even negligent "erroneous statement[s] ";231 the
Court realized that errors are "inevitable in free debate" in order to
ensure that "freedoms of expression . . .have the 'breathing space'

that they 'need ...to survive." 232 This landmark decision, like many
others, opts for underregulation of potentially harmful speech lest
protected speech be chilled. In other words, more speech is better
than less speech, and a more diverse public discourse must sometimes
be bought at the expense of a less civilized one.
C. Implications
These First Amendment assumptions are directly relevant to evaluating the contribution anonymous speech makes to public discourse
and to deciding how that contribution is to be weighed against other
important rights. Any regulation of anonymous speech should begin
with the presumption that information consumers are likely to discount unattributed speech and to use indicia other than author identity to judge its reliability. In other words, regulation of anonymous
speech should start with the assumption that the audience itself will
233
be able to dissipate much of the harm of anonymous speech.
Another implication is that anonymous speech is, presumptively, valuable speech. While First Amendment jurisprudence might prefer
attributed speech to anonymous speech, it clearly prefers anonymous
speech to no speech at all, especially when audiences can exercise
"self-help" to minimize the perils of anonymous speech. 234 This is not
231 Id. at 271-72.
232 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
233 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of
the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.
Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal."). Certainly we can and
sometimes do make different assumptions about the citizenry as information consumers. For example, regulation of the speech of issuers of securities is explicitly premised on paternalism. As the Supreme Court noted, writing specifically about socalled "blue sky" laws: "Such laws are to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition." Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973). Yet to make such paternalistic assumptions as a
general matter, especially when applied to core speech, is fundamentally antithetical
to democratic theory.
234 This argument is sometimes made in support of giving reporters a privilege to
protect confidential sources of information. The reporter's privilege increases the
overall quantity and quality of speech that the public receives, and it encourages
speakers to come forward when they might otherwise remain silent. However, there is
one key difference between the argument for a reporter's privilege and the argument
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to say that all audience members will be intelligent, sophisticated, critical readers; indeed, many audience members will not be capable of
the rationalism that is an article of faith in much First Amendment
jurisprudence. Even so, both democratic theory and First Amendment jurisprudence are deeply committed to respecting citizens'
autonomy and capacity for self-governance, and this commitment dictates a rationalist account of audience response to core speech rather
than a paternalistic one. 235 AsJustice Potter Stewart eloquently wrote,
"[e] nlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
2 36
which an open society is premised."
IV.

COPING WITH ANONYMOUS SPEECH:

A

GUIDE FOR

LEGISLATORS AND COURTS

The cost-benefit and constitutional analyses presented here have
important practical implications for both legislatures and courts.
Lawmakers who rely solely on the cost-benefit analysis might rationally
decide that anonymous speech is more trouble than it is worth,
despite its many benefits. But the First Amendment analysis tips the
balance. This Part provides guidance to legislatures about what types
of situations might justify statutes compelling disclosure of author
identity. We also argue that legislatures and courts should recognize a
privilege to speak anonymously in cases involving political or other
for a privilege to speak anonymously or pseudonymously, namely, that the reporter
who receives the information presumably knows the identity of the source and therefore vouches for its reliability.
235 Several theorists have focused on the importance of public discourse as a component of democracy. Robert Post, for example, quotes John Dewey for the proposition that "democracy begins in conversation," and Post's own theory focuses on how
Supreme Court decisions have made "public discourse" a central facet of our constitutional system. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 185-87 (1995) (quoting
DIALOGUE ON JOHN DEwEY 58 (Corliss Lamont ed., 1959)). Similarly, Robert Bennett
has proposed a "conversational model" to describe "the actual functioning of democracy in the United States." Robert W. Bennett, Counter-Conversationalismand the Sense of
Difficulty, 95 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 845, 871 (2001). Under this model, "an important influence in producing a sense on the part of citizens of involvement in the processes of
government-and thence of fidelity to its decisions-is its pervasive tendency to
direct conversation about public affairs their way." Id. Bennett concedes that the
discourse that results is not necessarily "enlightened or high-minded," id. at 872, but
his theory demands that citizens be capable of meaningful "engagement" in "ongoing
public conversation." See Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Coversation, 14
CONST. COMMENr. 481, 481 (1997).
236 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 (1972) (Stewart,J., dissenting) (arguing that the press promotes citizens' ability to make enlightened choices).
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core speech; a privilege that can only be overcome upon an exacting
2
showing of need by either the State or private litigants.

A.

7

When Should the State Mandate Disclosure?

Congress recently passed legislation criminalizing threatening,
harassing or "annoying" online anonymous speech.2 38 This patently
unconstitutional 39 statute is not the first or only legislative attempt to
quell online anonymous speech. 240 Nor will it be the last. Hence,
both legislators and their critics can benefit from the insights that this
analysis yields.
The first, and perhaps most obvious, insight is that legislatures
should not regulate anonymous speech in the literary, artistic or political realms, absent a compelling need for the regulation beyond simply providing the audience with more information. More specifically,
237 Of course, context can be crucial. Our focus remains centered principally on
anonymous speech as it relates to political campaigns and to torts such as defamation
and infringement. Other contexts may be quite different. As we noted above, for
example, in the context of civil litigation, courts occasionally permit parties to appear
anonymously, but there is certainly no presumption in favor of anonymous litigation.
See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) (listing factors that a court
should consider before allowing a party to proceed as a "Doe" defendant). In the
context of criminal litigation, courts rarely permit the State to withhold a testifying
witness's identity, taking into account the centrality of the witness to the prosecution
or defense case and the danger to the witness's safety. See, e.g., United States v.
Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 (lth Cir. 1982); Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P.3d
203, 223 (Cal. 2000). In such instances, constitutional guarantees of due process or
the right to confront one's accusers normally give rise to a presumption against anonymity. Similarly, we express no general views in this paper, though we may in future
work, on the constitutionality of "antimask" laws that forbid people from disguising
their identities in public places. These laws may chill some speech but may conceivably be justified as anti-intimidation measures. Compare Church of the Am. Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding an antimask
law constitutional), with Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F.
Supp. 2d 835, 840-42 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (declaring a similar law unconstitutional).
238 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223
(West 2006)) (purporting to restrict anonymous Internet communications made with
"intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person . . . who receives the
communication").
239 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[O]ne man's vulgarity is
another's lyric."); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ("Conduct
that annoys some people does not annoy others.").
240 See, e.g., Assemb. 1327, 212th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at: http://
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/Bills/A1500/1327_12.PDF; see ACLU v. Miller, 977 F.
Supp. 1228, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (striking down Georgia law forbidding Internet
users from falsely identifying themselves).
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in which (a) speakers
legislatures should not regulate types of speech
as literary or artistic speech), (b)
have high autonomy interests (such
and (c) a rational audience
the potential for abuse is relatively low,
potential harms. Considerexists with the ability to protect itself from
making hard choices between
ation of these factors will not obviate
will facilitate analysis of whether
competing interests in all cases, but it
or constitutionally warranted.
compelled disclosure is practically
of anonymous book
As an illustration, reconsider the example
criticisms of anonyreviews. Whatever the merits of Schopenhauer's
and unconstitutional to criminalmous reviewers, it would be unwise
speaker's autonomy interest in
ize anonymous book reviews. The
aesthetic judgments are notorimaking aesthetic judgments is high,
is likely to discount anonyously subjective, and a rational audience
wants to buy a copy of Milan
mous reviews. If, for example, a reader
Being from Amazon.com, she will
Kundera's The UnbearableLightness of
book's web page. As far as the
find 212 customer reviews on the
are anonymous, even when they
reader is concerned, these reviewers
reason to credit their aesthetic
include their real names. She has no
of their writing. It is unlikely
judgments apart from the persuasiveness
purchasing decision, and the
that any single review will influence her
review (say, one which abuses 2its
41
potential for damage from any one
of numerous other entries.
presence
the
by
mitigated
anonymity) is
212 reviews, but the reviews in
She almost certainly will not read all
about the popular opinion of
the aggregate provide information
to popular opinion, the reviews
Kundera's book; if she generally hews
the book.
242
may determine whether she purchases
are always harmless.
reviews
This is not to say that anonymous

reviews undue credit, and in this
Naive readers may give anonymous
successfully abuse the right to
case an anonymous reviewer could
a rival's book that he secretly
speak anonymously by skewering
is boorish, it would unduly
admires. Even though this behavior
it, especially where a
infringe speaker autonomy to criminalize
review as the subjective opinion of
rational audience will discount the
likely to
reviews might make the reader more
241 Quixotically, virulent negative
reviews
whose
controversial political author
purchase. Consider the case of a highly
desirable
more
book
the
opponents, making
garner countless emotional tirades from
controversial qualities.
author's
the
enjoys
who
fan
in the eyes of a
"Andrew Lloyd Webber," posted near-defama242 A prankster, masquerading as
Those Fake
John Schwartz, Who's Composing All
tory book reviews on Amazon.com.
endorseWebber
Lloyd
2001, at C4 ("[F]alse
Online Reviews?, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27,
...
ejaculation.
premature
and
halitosis
ments went to guidebooks on combating
qualify as
might
and
newspaper
this
in
print
Many of the reviews were not fit to
the law affords to obvious parodies.").
that
latitude
the
for
not
if
libelous
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someone whose motives and biases are unknown. Moreover, legal
remedies are available to pursue the speaker who crosses the line into
making false and defamatory factual assertions. A statute compelling
disclosure is simply too blunt an instrument to regulate anonymous
"core" speech that poses a low risk of harm when rationally
discounted.
A corollary, however, is that the State should have authority to
compel speakers to disclose their identities to their audiences when
the speakers' autonomy interests are particularly low and the potential
for abuse particularly high. Thus, nothing in our analysis would prevent legislatures from regulating anonymous unsolicited commercial
e-mail, or "spare." Estimates suggest that thirteen million spare are
sent each day, 243 many of them pseudonymously. The sender of the e-

mail is motivated by financial self-interest rather than self-fulfillment,
and the potential for fraud is high. 244 Even though most rational
audience members can protect themselves from fraudulent anonymous spare (if not from annoying anonymous spam), First Amendment jurisprudence specifically allows for a limited degree of
24 5
paternalistic regulation of commercial (as opposed to core) speech.
What, then, should legislators do in the realm of electoral
speech? Anonymous speech during election campaigns is largely
political speech, and yet the Supreme Court's electoral speech jurisprudence occasionally allows paternalistic regulation in the name of
ensuring an informed citizenry.2 46 As we saw in Part I, the compelled
disclosure provisions in McConnell rest in part on the assumption that
voters will not be able to perceive partisan bias in election advertisements, at least when the advertisements are run immediately before
an election. And yet the Supreme Court in Mills v. Alabama 2 47 struck

down a law that made it a crime for a newspaper to publish editorials
for or against a ballot measure on election day, even though the purpose of the law was to protect voters from "confusive last-minute
243 SeeJameel Harb, Note, White Buffalo Ventures, LLC v. University of Texas at
Austin: The CAN-SPAM Act & the Limitations of Legislative Spam Controls, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 531, 532 (2006).

244 Nigerian- banking con
spain-based fraud, and both
using electronic mail for any
245 See Cent. Hudson Gas
557, 562-64 (1980). But see

schemes and e-mail viruses are common examples of
should probably be familiar to anyone who has been
length of time.
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556-70

(2001).
246 See Levine, supra note 84, at 253-56 (discussing this paternalistic strain in electoral speech jurisprudence).
247 384 U.S. 214 (1966).

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1592 2006-2007

2007]

AUTHORSHIP,

AUDIENCES,

charges and countercharges." 24 s

AND

ANONYMOUS

SPEECH

1593

Mills refused to allow the state to

criminalize election-day editorials as a means of preventing voter confusion; paternalism simply could not justify such an "obvious and flagrant abridgement of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press."

249

Although detailing the problems with the Court's electoral
speech jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article, our normative analysis suggests that restrictions on political speech, even in the
electoral context (or especially in the electoral context), should not
be based on paternalistic assumptions about voters. Thus, the relevant question both for lawmakers and for courts ought to be whether
a compelled disclosure law can be justified without reference to paternalism. Reconsider the compelled disclosure provision in McConnell.2 5- 0

It was not motivated solely by the desire to protect the

audience from being misled by clever partisans.2 5 1 It was also motivated by the desire to prevent corporations and unions from circumventing contribution limits and to prevent politicians from being
corrupted. Our analysis does not undermine the legitimacy or weightiness of these concerns, but instead indicates that they should be evaluated standing alone, without the added weight of paternalistic
2
assumptions about voters to bolster them.

248

52

Id. at 219. The law made it a crime to solicit votes for or against a ballot pro-

position on election day, and the editor of the Birmingham Post-Herald was arrested

for violating it after his newspaper carried an election-day editorial urging voters to
adopt a mayor-council form of government. Id. at 215-16.
249 Id. at 219. In theory the arguments made against paternalistic regulation
should apply equally to broadcasting, but the Supreme Court has tolerated regulation
to achieve broadcast "fairness" due to the fact that the broadcast spectrum is a scarce
resource not available to all citizens. This sort of paternalistic regulation is reflected
in a 2005 FCC order directing broadcasters and cable operators to disclose the
"nature, source, and sponsorship" of "prepackaged news stores" or face up to a
$10,000 fine and/or a year in jail. See Frank Ahrens, Broadcasters Must Reveal Video
Clips' Sources, FCC Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2005, at A2.

250 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 198 (2003).
251 Voters certainly do not need to know the identity of the speaker to understand
that a purported issue ad that ended with the message "Contact Senators Feingold
and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster" of President Bush's judicial nominees is really a partisan ad aimed at defeating Feingold's bid for reelection. See Wis.
Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, No. 04-1260, 2004 WL 3622736, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 17,
2004), vacated by 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
252 The overall vitality of the regulatory scheme upheld in McConnell, 540 U.S. at
246, is already being called into question by the Supreme Court, albeit indirectly. See
Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 2492-94 (2006); Wis. Right to Life, 546 U.S. at
411-12.
A more difficult illustration is presented by the anonymous speech regulation in
Justicefor All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 2005). A "literature policy" at the
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BalancingAnonymous Speech Rights in Torts Cases

In the last ten years, courts have found themselves adjudicating
more disputes pitting the rights of anonymous speakers against the
rights of those allegedly harmed by their speech. The typical case
begins with the aggrieved plaintiff bringing suit against a 'John Doe"
for anonymously publishing defamation, perpetrating fraud, divulging
trade secrets, or violating the plaintiffs copyright-all on the
Internet.2 53 The plaintiff files suit, then subpoenas "John Doe's" ISP
University of Texas required all printed materials distributed on campus, regardless of
subject matter, to contain the name of a University-affiliated person or group responsible for distribution. Id. at 763. One of the University's justifications for restricting
anonymous leafleting was to "preserve the campus for use by students, faculty, and
staff' by excluding "non-affiliated" speakers from distributing literature on campus.
Id. at 764. An anti-abortion student group contended that the literature policy
abridged its First Amendment right of anonymous speech, and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed. Id. at 763. The court recognized anonymous speech on university
campuses as an important means of expressing "controversial ideas." Id. at 765. In
other words, the court acknowledged the strong autonomy interests of students in
speaking anonymously on campus. However, the case was complicated by the fact
that university campuses are not open to the public; the court therefore had to parse
public forum jurisprudence before concluding that the area affected by the literature
policy was a designated public forum. Id. at 766-69. As regulation of speech in a
public forum, the literature policy had to pass "strict scrutiny," at least the version
applicable to content neutral regulations. It failed. Id. at 769-71. Although the
court acknowledged that the University's interest in "preserving the campus for student use" was significant, it held that the literature policy was not narrowly tailored to
advance that interest. Id. at 769. Although the literature policy affected only leaflets
and not other forms of anonymous speech, the court still concluded that it placed an
inordinate burden on anonymous speech because it "require[d] the speaker to identify himself, not just to certain University officials, but to every person who receives the
literature being distributed." Id. at 771. The court then suggested that lesser restrictions on anonymous speech, such as requiring a registered student to notify university
officials before distributing leaflets, might be narrowly enough tailored to survive
strict scrutiny. Id. Although the court's decision reached ajustifiable conclusion, our
positive analysis points out a significant factor that the court's decision overlooked.
The regulation was not aimed at protecting the audience from any harm that would
flow from the anonymous speech; rather, it was aimed at protecting them from the
secondary effects of speech, namely the presence of "unauthorized" anonymous
speakers who might displace authorized speakers from the university campus.
253 See cases cited infra note 255; see also Lidsky, supra note 10, at 858 n.6 (listing
numerous libel cases brought against pseudonymous Internet speakers between 1995
and 2000). For commentary on this phenomenon, see Victoria Smith Ekstrand,
UnmaskingJane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8 COMM. L. &
PoL'v 405, 407 (2003); David L. Sobel, The Process that "JohnDoe" is Due: Addressing the
Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 VA.J.L. & TECH. 3,
1-2 (2000), http://www.
vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5ila3-Sobel.html; Shaun B. Spencer, CyberSLAPP Suits
andJohn Doe Subpoenas, 19J. MARSHAILLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 (2001); Michael S.
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to reveal his true identity. If John Doe is lucky, his ISP notifies him
and he is able to file a motion to quash the subpoena. At that point, a
court must decide whether and how to balance the plaintiffs right to
proceed in tort with the defendant's right to speak anonymously. If
all it takes is an allegation of defamation to uncover a defendant's
identity, the right to speak anonymously is very fragile indeed, because
it is easy for a plaintiff to allege defamation any time he comes in for
harsh criticism online. 254 On the other hand, anonymity should not
immunize the defendant's tortious conduct. How, then, is a judge to
adjudicate the dispute?
Some courts have simply found the anonymous speaker's rights
unworthy of protection once the plaintiff has alleged the speech is
tortious. 2

55

More commonly, though, courts have struggled to bal-

ance the rights of plaintiffs and defendants, adopting a variety of different standards to the task. 2 56 The most noteworthy recent decision
Vogel, Unmasking "JohnDoe" Defendants: The Case Against Excessive Hand-Wringing over
Legal Standards,83 OR. L. REv. 795, 803-15 (2004); Jennifer O'Brien, Note, Putting a
Face to a (Screen) Name, 70 FoRHAM L. REv. 2745, 2753-58 (2002).
254 The lawsuits are not frivolous merely because they are brought to silence the
defendant. Defamation suits are almost always aimed at "silencing the defendant, and
from the standpoint of traditional First Amendment law, there is no harm in silencing
knowingly or recklessly false statements of fact, for these statements have no value to
public discourse." See Lidsky, supra note 10, at 860.
255 See, e.g., Court Order at 1-2, Hvide v. John Does I Through 8, No. 99-22831
(Fla. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author, who was acting as counsel for the
Does at the hearing in which the judge made this statement) (comparing anonymous
speakers to hooded Ku Klux Klan members); Vogel, supra note 253, at 803 & n.39
(citing Court Order, supra, at 1-2; Court Order at 1-2, Biomatrix, Inc. v. Doe I, No.
BER-L-70-00 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 28, 2000); In re Imperial Sugar Co., No.
2000-33782 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 21, 2000)) (finding that these cases "contained little if
any analysis of the competing interests").
256 In addition to the copyright infringement cases cited supra at notes 110-19,
some of the more noteworthy attempts to develop protections for anonymous speech
include Doe v. 2TheMart, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001); Columbia Insurance Co. v, Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Doe v.
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457-58 (Del. 2005) (adopting "summary judgment" standard);
Dendrite International v. Does, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(adopting a four-part balancing test); Lassa v. Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis.
2006) (holding that under Wisconsin law a trial court should decide a pending
motion to dismiss a defamation claim before compelling disclosure of the identities of
anonymous speakers). But see Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46-50 (Pa. 2003) (not
articulating a clear standard); Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA
Dev., Inc., No. 0425, 2006 WL 37020, at *8-9 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 4, 2006) (concluding that ordinary discovery processes were sufficient to balance the relevant interests).
A Virginia statute gives procedural protections to anonymous Internet speakers
alleged to have committed torts. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (Supp. 2006).
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of this second type is Doe v. Cahill,25 7 which serves as a good point of

departure for developing a uniform framework, whether statutory or
judicial, to protect the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants. In
Cahill the plaintiffs filed suit against a 'John Doe" defendant for defamation and invasion of privacy. 25s Writing under the pseudonym
"Proud Citizen," the defendant criticized plaintiff Cahill's performance as a city councilman on a website devoted to discussion of local
politics.2

59

Plaintiffs complained that two postings in particular were

defamatory. The first praised the local mayor and called Cahill, in
contrast, "a divisive impediment to any kind of cooperative movement," asserting that "[a]nyone who has spent any amount of time
with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration. 260 The other posting again
praised the mayor and stated "Gahill [sic] is as paranoid as everyone
in the town thinks he is."261 Plaintiffs obtained a court order requiring Doe's ISP to disclose his identity. The provider notified Doe, who
filed a motion to prevent disclosure, which the judge denied on the
2 62
ground that plaintiffs had a good faith basis for their tort claims.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found the good faith
standard to be insufficiently protective of anonymous speakers' First
Amendment rights.

263

Instead, the Court, faced with "an entire spec-

trum of 'standards' that could be required," 26 4 held that plaintiffs
must meet a "summary judgment standard" before piercing a defendant's anonymity. Under this standard a plaintiff must: (1) provide
notice to the anonymous poster, to the extent possible, that his identity is being sought and allow defendant a reasonable opportunity to
respond;2 6 5 (2) establish the prima facie elements of his claim sufficiently to avoid summary judgment. 2 66 The court believed that no
explicit balancing of interests was necessary, since balancing was
257 884 A.2d 451.
258 Plaintiff councilman and his wife originally filed suit against four John Doe
defendants. Only one defendant appealed. See id. at 454.
259 The court also referred to it as a blog. Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 The trial judge determined that, in order to obtain disclosure of Doe's identity,
the plaintiffs had to establish a "good faith basis" for their claims, that the identity was
"directly and materially related to their claim," and "that the information could not
be obtained from any other source." Id. at 455.
263 Id. at 457.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 460-61.
266 Id. at 461.
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already entailed in the application of the summary judgment
26 7
standard.
The Delaware Supreme Court was careful to tailor the summary
judgment standard to the defamation context, requiring the plaintiff
to "introduce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact" only
for those elements "within the plaintiff's control."26 8 What that meant in
Cahill was that the plaintiff, a public figure, had to produce prima
facie evidence that the defendant published a false and defamatory
statement concerning him to a third party; once plaintiff established
these elements, the court would compel disclosure to allow plaintiff to
establish the remaining element of his claim, namely that the defendant made the statement with knowledge or reckless disregard of its
falsity (that is, with actual malice). The court believed this standard
fairly balanced the plaintiffs and defendant's interests since plaintiff
had "easy access to proof' of all of these elements except for actual
2 69
malice, which hinges on the defendant's state of mind.

Applying this standard, the court concluded that no reasonable
person would interpret the substitution of a "G" for the "C" in "Cahill"
as an indication that Mr. Cahill had a same-sex affair. 270 Nor would it
conclude that Cahill was mentally ill. The "Gahill" statement was
more likely a typo than a homosexual slur, and the paranoia allegation was merely a statement of opinion rather than an assertion of
fact. 27 1 The court based this determination in part on how "reasona-

ble readers" decode anonymous messages on Internet websites or
blogs. Such readers take their cues from context and "are unlikely to
view messages posted anonymously as assertions of fact,"2 7 2 especially
2 73
when they appear on websites filled with invective and hyperbole.
The Court pointed out that the website's guidelines stated that it was
devoted to "opinions" about local politics. Moreover, at least one
reader of Doe's postings responded that "'your tone and choice of
words is [that of] a type of person that couldn't convince me. You
sound like the person with all the anger and hate . "274 Read in
267
268
269

Id.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 463-64. The court stressed that the first element-which requires courts

to determine whether a statement contains factual assertions that are capable of a

defamatory meaning-is "perhaps the most important" in establishing the legitimacy
of a plaintiffs claim. Id. at 463.
270 Id. at 467.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 465 (quoting Rocker Mgmt., LLC v. John Does 1 Through 20, No. 03MG-33, 2003 WL 22149380, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003)).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 467.
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context, Doe's statements were "incapable of a defamatory meaning."2 75 The court therefore held that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
summary judgment standard necessary to obtain Doe's true identity.
The Delaware Supreme Court's approach in Cahill is broadly consistent with the kind of balancing this Article advocates. However, it is
the first decision on this issue by a state's high court, and it adds yet
another standard to the "spectrum" available to any court or legislature searching for a workable solution. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
lay out the steps in a workable solution in the hope that a uniform
standard will evolve from the current morass. This uniform standard
could be enacted by legislators or adopted by courts. The components of an ideal standard are as follows.
1.

Notice to the Anonymous Speaker

The first component is a requirement that anonymous speakers
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. A speaker cannot
defend her right to speak anonymously unless she receives notice that
her identity is being sought in a civil or criminal action and she is
given an opportunity to come forward to assert her rights. Obviously,
the notice requirement cannot be applied too stringently when the
defendant's identity is unknown. In the Internet context, it is reasonable to require the plaintiff to post notice on the same website, blog,
chat room, or other forum where the defendant's allegedly tortious
communication was made. Moreover, since plaintiff will ordinarily
seek the defendant's identity from an ISP, it is logical to require the
ISP to give notice to its subscriber before disclosing the subscriber's
identity. The Cable Communications Policy Act places such a burden
on operators of cable systems that provide internet service, 2 76 but
these requirements should be extended to cover other claims as well
to help guarantee the defendant has a chance to defend his right to
speak anonymously before it is too late.
275 Id.
276 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 2, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2000)). The Cable Communications Policy Act

prohibits the dissemination of subscriber data by operators of cable systems without
consent, unless the disclosure is necessary to render service or if it is made to a government entity pursuant to court order, in which case the subscriber must be notified

of the order and given an opportunity to prohibit or limit the disclosure. Id. This act
was subsequently modified by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 § 20, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). See Fitch v. Doe, 869 A.2d 722, 725-27
(Me. 2005) (noting that the trial court erred in ruling a subscriber had consented to
disclosure; under 47 U.S.C. § 551 (c) (2) (B), the ISP could release such information to
a nongovernmental entity in response to court order if it notified the subscriber).
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Applying a Qualified Privilege to Speak Anonymously

Once the anonymous speaker challenges disclosure of his or her
identity, a court must step in to determine whether the speaker
enjoyed a privilege to speak anonymously and, if so, whether the
plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to overcome that privilege.
As a threshold matter, the court must determine whether the speech
at issue is core First Amendment speech, as defined (broadly) by
Supreme Court precedent.2 77 If the anonymous speech at issue is
core speech, the qualified right to speak anonymously acts as a privilege to protect the anonymous speaker's identity from automatic
disclosure.278

Although the process we advocate here differs little from the process applied in Cahill, it is nonetheless useful to describe the process
in terms of privilege law. Privilege concepts are familiar to both First
Amendment law and tort law.2 7 9 A variety of First Amendment and
277 Defining core First Amendment speech creates troublesome issues at the margins, but it is clear, at a minimum, that core speech includes discussions of political,
literary, artistic, historical, cultural and social concerns. See generally Harry Kalven,Jr.,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaningof the First Amendment," 1964
Sup. CT. REv. 191, 208 ("The Amendment has a 'central meaning'-a core of protection of speech without which democracy cannot function, without which, in
Madison's phrase, 'the censorial power' would be in the Government over the people
and not 'in the people over the Government."').
278 As for the copyright infringement cases involving the file sharing of recorded
music, we suggested above that the act of file sharing is partially expressive, even if it is
also (perhaps predominantly) conduct to which the expression is incidental. See
supra Part ILB.4. We therefore tend to agree with those courts that have required
plaintiffs to overcome the presumption of anonymity with, inter alia, specific supporting evidence that the file sharer has downloaded copyrighted material. See supra
notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
279 The "reporter's privilege" to shield confidential sources is probably the most
familiar. Depending on the jurisdiction, the basis for any applicable "reporter's privilege" may be a statute, a state constitution, common law, or possibly the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See FANKLIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 577 (discussing
sources of reporter's privilege). The Supreme Court has never recognized a
reporter's privilege based on the First Amendment, but many lower courts have interpreted the Court's unusual and enigmatic decision in Branzburgv. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972), "as creating a federal constitutional privilege." FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note
193, at 575. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does
not shield reporters from having to testify before grand juries about information
obtained from confidential sources. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. Branzburg was a 5-4
decision, but Justice Powell, who joined the majority opinion, wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing how "limited" the majority decision was and suggesting that he
would extend reporters a testimonial privilege in some circumstances. Id. at 709-10
(Powell, J., concurring). The irony of Branzburg is that Justice Powell's concurrence
ultimately lent weight to the dissenting Justices' contention that the First Amendment
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tort privileges attempt to balance competing interests in ways that foster open discussion and debate. 28 0 Sullivan, the most famous First
Amendment case of the twentieth century, is often described as creating a constitutional privilege to criticize public officials; a plaintiff can
overcome the privilege by showing that the defendant's speech was
false and made with actual malice. And courts have developed a number of qualified privileges, such as the privilege to fairly and accurately
report information in an open public record, to protect public discussion from suffering the chilling effects of defamation liability. One
virtue of describing the right to speak anonymously in this familiar
way is that it suggests at the outset that the right is not absolute but
must be balanced against plaintiffs' interests in order to foster uninhibited public discourse. Moreover, it suggests the relevant mechanism for balancing: Once the privilege applies, it creates something in
the nature of a presumption that the defendant's identity is protected
and places the burden on the plaintiff to overcome it by establishing,
28 1
in essence, the legitimacy of her need for disclosure.
3.

Overcoming the Privilege

In order to overcome the privilege to speak anonymously, a plaintiff should be required to provide prima facie evidence to support
those elements of plaintiffs claim that are within plaintiff's control.
In other words, the plaintiff must provide prima facie evidence of elements that are not dependent on defendant's identity, like the defamatory nature of the communication, publication, and identification.
By helping to guarantee the legitimacy of plaintiff's claim, this
requirement ameliorates the threat that plaintiffs will bring claims
merely to silence or retaliate against those who criticize them. Moreover, it strikes a proper balance between the interests of plaintiffs and
defendants. The plaintiff is able to uncover the defendant's identity,
but only when she shows the identity is necessary for the plaintiff to
creates a qualified privilege for reporters who are subpoenaed to appear before grand
juries. See id. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart later suggested that considering Powell's concurrence, Branzburg could be characterized as rejecting the

reporters' claim of privilege by a vote of "four and a half to four and a half." Potter
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 635 (1975).
280 See FRA.LIN ET AL., supra note 193, at 259-62 (discussing common law privileges that apply in defamation actions).
281 Michael Vogel is correct in asserting that existing procedural rules could be
used to protect the right to speak anonymously. See Vogel, supra note 253, at 823.
But a formal mechanism for protecting the right, such as the privilege we advocate

here, focuses attention on the significance of the right and guides the balancing that
is to take place, thereby increasing predictability.
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pursue her claim. The burden of producing prima facie evidence of
the elements of her claim is one that the plaintiff must bear anyway;
all that this requirement does is to require this evidence be produced
at the outset, prior to disclosure of defendant's identity. Cahill
demonstrated how such a burden could be met by defamation
plaintiffs.
Although defamation is the most common tort brought against
anonymous speakers, there is no practical reason why the same
approach could not be taken to other types of tort cases involving
expressive speech. For example, a plaintiff alleging misappropriation
of a trade secret by an anonymous defendant should be required to
produce evidence tending to show that the information disclosed was
indeed a trade secret. 28 2 Establishing this element does not require

defendant's identity, and it serves as an indicium of the genuineness
of plaintiffs claim. Once established, the plaintiff should be able to
obtain defendant's identity to establish misappropriation, which
depends on the status and mental state of the defendant. This same
approach can and should be applied to other tort claims brought
based on anonymous speech.
4.

Balancing Harms

One final component should be added to the privilege analysis.
If a plaintiff is able to overcome the defendant's privilege to speak
anonymously, the defendant should have a final opportunity to convince the judge, in camera, that the magnitude of harm she faces if
her identity is revealed outweighs the plaintiffs need for her identity.
Only at this point would a court need to consider the speaker's actual
motive (e.g., fear of death) and, if necessary, to engage in the difficult
task of weighing the competing interests. 28 3 Although a defendant
would rarely be able to establish a threat of sufficient magnitude to
282 A trade secret can be any information that "derives independent economic
value . . .from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or
use," and is subject to "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538
(2005). As with copyright infringement, however, there may be a preliminary ques-

tion of whether the act of using or disclosing an alleged trade secret is expressive
speech or merely conduct. For a recent discussion of the occasional tensions between
First Amendment law and trade secret law, see Pamela Samuelson, Principlesfor Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Public
Law Research Paper No. 925056, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925056.
283 But cf. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579-80 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
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this last component
outweigh plaintiffs need for defendant's identity,
final piece of insurance that defenof the privilege analysis serves as a
not too lightly compromised.
dant's right to speak anonymously is
CONCLUSION

wrote that "the First AmendJudge Learned Hand once famously
be
conclusions are more likely to
ment . .. presupposes that right
of
kind
than through any
gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
but
this is, and always will be, folly;
authoritative selection. To many
democ284 As Judge Hand recognized,
we have staked upon it our all."
for themselves

ability to decide
racy rests on our faith in citizens'
This same faith underlies the
where truth lies in public discourse.
a First Amendment right to speak
Supreme Court's recognition of
speech decisions manifest a
anonymously. The Court's anonymous citizens' ability to discount
in
faith, albeit one that wavers at times,
from its harms, at
themselves
anonymous information and protect
is being challenged by the Internetleast in most cases. This faith
Legislators increasingly seek to
fueled growth of anonymous speech.
name of protecting citizens from
curb anonymous speech in the
must adjudicate tort claims against
harm, and courts increasingly
and courts need guidance in
anonymous speakers. Both legislatures
Supreme Court has failed to provide.
dealing with these issues that the
We provide a positive analyThis Article provides that guidance.
and bad, of anonymous speakers.
sis of the motivations, both good
by recent scholarship on the tradeOur positive analysis is supported
we use to show how audiences
mark function of authorship, which
and thereby decode anonymous
infer the motivations of authors
fails to show that anonymous
speech. Even so, our positive analysis
social good than social harm.
speech, on balance, produces more
jurisprudence and demoWe therefore turn to First Amendment
basis for protecting anonymous
cratic theory to provide a normative
on how to balance it against other
speech and to provide guidance
largely forbid paternalistic regulation
important rights. These sources
matters at the core of the First
of anonymous speech concerning
the first line of defense against the
Amendment, and they suggest that is audience "self-help."2 8 5
speech
threat posed by anonymous
legislators against passing legisUltimately, therefore, we caution
their identities in the name of
lation compelling authors to disclose
Compelled disclosure cannot
providing audiences more information:
1943), affd,
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
284 United States v. Associated
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
285 See supra Part III.A.
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be justified absent a compelling need for author identity, at least in
the realm of core speech. We also advocate that legislatures enact or
courts adopt an evidentiary privilege to safeguard the right to speak
anonymously from the chilling effect of "cyberSLAPPs." Adoption of
the privilege would bring a uniform approach to the vexing problem
of balancing the rights of anonymous speakers with the rights of those
harmed by their speech.
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